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ABSTRACT
US state chartered commercial banks are supervised alternately by state and federal regulators. Each
regulator supervises a given bank for a fixed time period according to a predetermined rotation schedule.
We use unique data to examine differences between federal and state regulators for these banks. Federal
regulators are significantly less lenient, downgrading supervisory ratings about twice as frequently
as state supervisors. Under federal regulators, banks report higher nonperforming loans, more delinquent
loans, higher regulatory capital ratios, and lower ROA. There is a higher frequency of bank failures
and problem-bank rates in states with more lenient supervision relative to the federal benchmark. Some
states are more lenient than others. Regulatory capture by industry constituents and supervisory staff
characteristics can explain some of these differences. These findings suggest that inconsistent oversight
can hamper the effectiveness of regulation by delaying corrective actions and by inducing costly variability
in operations of regulated entities.
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1.  Introduction 
 
At least since Pigou (1938), economists have been interested in effective regulatory design. A 
critical element of this design involves assessing how regulatory institutions themselves affect 
the implementation of regulations. This is a complex question, as it often entails understanding 
the interactions among several regulatory agencies with overlapping jurisdictions, as well as the 
degree to which they are consistent in implementing the rules.  Several anecdotes suggest that 
inconsistent oversight by regulators could hinder regulatory effectiveness, none clearer than the 
demise of Washington Mutual Bank (WaMu), a $300 billion thrift and the sixth largest US bank 
at the time of its failure.
1 According to a formal congressional investigation, WaMu’s failure – 
the largest bank failure in US history – was, to a large extent, due to delayed corrective action 
that resulted from inconsistent oversight by its regulators, the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) 
and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC).
2 Despite the relevance of this issue, little 
systematic evidence exists on whether there is differential implementation of regulation by 
regulators – in banking or other industries – its drivers, or its consequences. We attempt to fill 
this gap by analyzing supervisory decisions of US banking regulators.  
 
The current regulatory structure in US banking provides a convenient laboratory for studying the 
issue of regulatory inconsistency because it involves dual supervision of institutions – i.e., 
supervision by both state and federal regulators. Using a natural experiment to circumvent the 
issue of banks self-selecting into different regulatory environments, we provide evidence of 
inconsistent implementation of identical rules by federal and state regulators. This inconsistency 
arises due to differences in the institutional design and incentives of these regulators. 
Furthermore, we show that this inconsistency may be costly, as it induces variability in bank 
operations, and that it may hamper the effectiveness of regulation by delaying corrective action. 
 
Inconsistent implementation of regulation by state and federal regulators relates broadly to the 
debate on effectiveness of dual regulatory structure that has taken place in several industries, 
including banking (see Scott 1977; Dixon and Weiser 2006). The fallout from the recent 
financial crisis has triggered massive regulatory reform in banking (see Brunnermeier et al. 
(2009)). However, most of these reforms have targeted activities that should be regulated, while 
the discussion on reforming the current dual structure of supervision in banking has been less 
active. This paucity of discussion is not due to the lack of arguments for and against the current 
                                                            
1 More anecdotes on ineffective regulation due to inconsistent supervision by US state and federal banking 
regulators are available in Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs (1994). There are also abundant 
examples of regulatory impediments due to inconsistencies between state and federal regulators in other industries 
(see for example Lane (2004) for securities regulation, Dixon and Weiser (2006) for telecommunication regulation 
and Esworthy (2008) for regulations on pollution control). 
2 Absent a deal between the FDIC and JP Morgan Chase to take over WaMu’s assets, this failure would have 
exhausted the entire Deposit Insurance Fund. More detail on the tussle between the OTS and FDIC in the run up to 
WaMu’s failure in September 2008 is available in the Office of Inspector General (2010)  and the congressional 
investigation report (Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs (2011)).   2 
 
regulatory structure.
3 On the one hand, proponents argue that informational advantage of state 
supervisors coupled with broader perspective of federal supervisors enhances the nature of 
decision making. In addition, having competing supervisors allows for lower political 
interference, giving banks the choice of picking the less “tyrannical” regulator and a more 
efficient allocation in the sense of Tiebout (1956). On the other hand, critics suggest that such a 
complex supervisory structure may create coordination and informational problems between 
entities. It may also produce regulatory inconsistencies and result in a “race to the bottom” in 
terms of regulatory laxity. Lack of empirical evidence validating or refuting these claims has 
implied that the debate on the effectiveness of the current regulatory structure has been muted 
and largely informed by anecdotes. 
 
The lack of empirical evidence stems from two main difficulties. First, it is hard to find 
comparable metrics of behavior across the myriad of dimensions affected by different regulators 
overseeing different firms, in particular complex entities such as banks. To overcome this issue, 
we rely on the easy-to-compare results of safety and soundness on-site examinations by 
regulators, which are crucial micro-prudential supervisory tools. These examinations culminate 
in the assignment of a CAMELS rating, which summarizes the conditions of the bank on a 
numerical scale. Second, and perhaps more challenging, it is difficult to tell if a bank picked the 
supervisor more suited to actions it intended to undertake or the regulator itself changed the 
actions taken by a bank. More precisely, a bank’s regulatory setting is not random, rather it is 
determined endogenously through a charter choice, and thus, driven by observable and 
unobservable bank characteristics.  
 
Our identification strategy exploits a legally determined rotation policy that assigns federal and 
state supervisors to the same banks at exogenously predetermined time intervals. This allows us 
to circumvent the issue of banks sorting into different regulatory settings. The policy on 
alternating examinations was introduced in the Riegle Act of 1994 and subsequent regulatory 
provisions with the goal of reducing administrative requirements for insured depository 
institutions (that is, eliminating the burden of facing both federal and state examination in the 
same year). The law assigns state chartered commercial banks to fixed 12-month or 18-month 
rotations between state and federal supervisors. In particular, the rotation involves state 
regulators and the FDIC for non-member banks (NMBs) and state regulators and the Federal 
Reserve (Fed) for state member banks of the Federal Reserve System (SMBs). SMB and NMB 
entities combined cover a substantial portion of the US banking industry, about 30 percent in 
terms of total assets and 80 percent in terms of the number of commercial banks.
4   
 
                                                            
3 See House Committee on Banking and Currency.(1965), Scott (1977), Butler and Macey (1987).  
4 Unfortunately, this excludes interesting subsamples, such as national banks, primarily overseen by the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) and thrifts, overseen by the Office of Thrift Supervision until 2011:Q1, and 
currently by the OCC.  We discuss the applicability of our results to this set of banks in Section 6. 3 
 
The central contribution of this paper lies in its empirical design and it is best understood by this 
simple example. Consider a bank (B) that can be supervised by either a state regulator (S) or by a 
federal regulator (Fed). An ideal experiment assessing differences in supervisory decisions 
would assign B to both S and Fed simultaneously and consequently track differences in their 
actions. Our empirical design mimics this ideal experiment closely. In particular, S and Fed are 
alternatively assigned to B every t periods, with t predetermined by our policy instrument and not 
chosen by B. This allows us to compare supervisory decisions within the same bank and estimate 
causal effects as if we were evaluating the effect of S and Fed on B concurrently. Given that the 
assignment of regulators is governed by a predetermined policy instrument, we are able to track 
not only the nature of supervisory decisions of S and Fed regarding B, but also the consequences 
of these decisions on bank B’s actual operations. 
 
In our main tests we use unique data to assess the difference in supervisory activities of federal 
and state regulators. These activities involve examining depository institutions to evaluate safety 
and soundness conditions. The process culminates in a compliance report for each bank, whose 
assessment is summarized by a CAMELS rating, an acronym for its six components: capital 
adequacy, asset quality, management and administration, earnings, liquidity, and sensitivity to 
market risk. We identify a systematic effect of supervisor identity on these ratings. Federal 
supervisors are significantly more likely to downgrade CAMELS ratings for the same bank 
relative to state supervisors (and, in the case of the Federal Reserve, they are also more cautious 
in upgrading these ratings). These effects are larger for Fed-state supervised SMBs when 
compared with FDIC-state supervised NMBs. In addition, the tougher stance by federal 
regulators is subsequently mimicked by their state counterparts, which do not appear to 
systematically overturn federal decisions. These results are quantitatively large, as federal 
supervisors appear twice as likely to downgrade relative to state supervisors. We also examine 
which of the subcomponents of the rating are responsible for these effects and find that the 
effects are present for all subcomponents. 
 
Next, we examine if banks respond to the heightened threat of a downgrade stemming from a 
federal supervisor by changing their operations. We find evidence of substantial changes in 
banking operations following federal supervision. In particular, banks report higher capital ratios, 
a drop in their profitability, and a worsening of their asset quality, as measured by the ratio of 
delinquent and nonperforming loans, in presence of federal regulators. We interpret these results 
as reflective of the supervisory authority being used by federal regulators in making a bank take 
corrective actions to address the problems highlighted in the examination. Interestingly, several 
of these effects are also detectible as the federal supervisory cycle, whose timing is pre-
determined, approaches. This evidence suggests that banks also undertake "window dressing" in 
anticipation of tougher federal regulators. These results are consistent with an earlier literature on 
the informational value of bank examinations in inducing corrective adjustments of a bank’s 4 
 
books (Berger and Davies, 1998; Gunther and Moore, 2003) and complement it by showing that 
these effects are evident in a cleanly identified empirical setting. 
 
We further examine whether the more lenient supervision behavior displayed by state regulators 
is costly. We find that states with more lenient state regulators relative to their federal 
counterparts also have higher bank failure rates and problem-bank rates (i.e., rates of banks close 
to failing) in our sample period. Although, it is difficult to assess whether a less lenient 
supervisory stance is good or bad, this analysis does suggest that there are adverse consequences 
of state regulators’ leniency. When evaluating the downside of stringency, we do not find 
support for the hypothesis that tougher regulators constrain supply of new loans. 
 
We end our analysis by showing that there is substantial regional heterogeneity in the leniency of 
state  regulators relative to their federal counterparts and by examining reasons behind these 
differences. One reason for a softer stance by state supervisors could be that they may be 
“captured” by the constituents they oversee. In particular, since banks only pay assessment fees 
to state regulators (Blair and Kushmeider (2006)), it is possible that state supervisors maintain a 
more lenient stance to ensure that banks do not shift out of a given state in search of another state 
with even softer state regulators. We find some suggestive evidence supporting this conjecture. 
The federal-state difference in supervisory downgrades increases with the size of the bank that is 
being supervised. This should be expected, as state supervisors may care more about bigger 
banks since assessment fees are proportional to bank size. We also find evidence that supervisory 
staff characteristics may explain some cross-state differences. Although our evidence is far from 
conclusive, we view it as a reasonable first attempt at systematically investigating and 
quantitatively assessing the sources of heterogeneity across federal and state regulators.  
 
Overall, while the paper falls short of providing a definitive answer as to whether the US dual 
supervisory system is optimal, to our knowledge it is the only paper that clearly documents 
inconsistent implementation of the same set of rules by different regulators within this system. 
This is a consequential finding, since inconsistencies between regulators can delay corrective 
regulatory actions (e.g., the case of WaMu) and  induce variability in bank operations. Moreover, 
inconsistent implementation may potentially reduce the transparency of bank balance-sheets for 
agents in the economy who are unaware of the source of this variability, as the exact alternation 
schedule of regulators for each bank is not known to the public. As shown in Caballero, Hoshi, 
and Kashyap (2008), lack of timeliness of corrective banking actions as well as opaque balance-
sheet information can be costly and can adversely impact real allocations. Importantly, these 
adverse effects are present in our sample regardless of whether the inconsistency between federal 
and state regulators is a result of deliberate design or an unplanned feature of the current 
regulatory structure. In other words, delays in taking corrective action and reduction in 5 
 
transparency of balance-sheets can be costly whether, loosely speaking, a possible "bad cop/good 
cop" implicit arrangement between federal and state regulators we uncover is intended or not.
5   
 
Our work is broadly related to several strands of the economics and finance literature. First, it is 
most directly related to work on regulatory design. The issue of the design of regulation spans 
from its early public interest roots to the Chicago theory of Stigler (1971) and Peltzman (1976), 
who argued that regulation is often captured by the industry it is meant to regulate and is 
designed primarily for insiders’ benefit, to the rent seeking theory of regulation (e.g. Shleifer and 
Vishny (1999).
6 Most of this work (including in the context of banking) debates the pros and 
cons of different regulatory structures, but provides surprisingly little systematic empirical 
evidence. Our work contributes to this literature by highlighting systematic regulatory 
inconsistencies and tracing their consequences – that is, their effects on banks' behavior.  
 
Second, and more relevant to the issue of regulatory inconsistencies, this paper speaks to a 
relatively established literature (mostly concerning industrial organization) that focuses on 
regulatory consistency and regulatory uncertainty.
7 Not unlike our paper, this literature also 
studies some sources of regulatory inconsistencies (e.g. elected versus appointed regulators 
(Besley and Coate (2003)) as well as their consequences (e.g. differential firm productivity).   
 
Third, this paper is connected to studies on regulatory arbitrage (Rosen, 2003; Rosen, 2005; 
Rezende, 2011) that suggests that banks actively shop for regulators who are likely to be softer 
on them through different channels such as charter changes, mergers with other banks, 
supervisory ratings, or changing their location of incorporation. Other work in this area (Kane, 
2000; Calomiris, 2006) also discusses changes in regulatory standards (constituting a "race to the 
bottom") due to competition between regulators (on account of "regulator shopping" by those 
regulated). In general, this arbitraging behavior by banks may induce a potentially sizeable 
selection bias in examining the effects of regulatory actions. Our empirical design circumvents 
this issue and provides causal estimates of the influence of regulators.
8 
                                                            
5 The Riegle Act was predominantly motivated by red tape reduction, in no part of its text does it appear focused on 
the creation of a deliberate optimal mix of more and less lenient regulators. Our personal discussion of the matter 
with several supervision and regulation experts also appears to strongly support the view that this is not an 
aforethought feature of the regulatory structure. In addition, to the best of these practitioners’ knowledge, although 
inconsistent implementation conforms to their priors, no specific gain (e.g. extra information conceded by the bank) 
is commonly recognized as originating from such out-of-step behavior of the federal and state regulators.  
6 The public interest roots go back as far as Pigou (1938). For a comprehensive review of the public interest theory 
see Laffont and Tirole (1993), which also focuses on a modern take on regulation, encompassing the role of 
asymmetric information. Also related is the work on banking regulation by Dewatripont and Tirole (1994); Boot and 
Thakor (1993); and Hellman, Murdock and Stiglitz (2000) among the others. The issue of centralized versus 
decentralized regulation, often discussing state versus federal regulation in the US context, has received theoretical 
attention in Martimort (1999), Laffont and Martimort (1999), and Laffont and Pouyet (2004) among the others. 
7 See Brennan and Schwartz (1982a, b); Viscusi (1983); Prager (1989); and Teisberg (1993). 
8 The literature on regulatory shopping and a race to the bottom extends beyond banking. For instance, there is 
literature on international trade that provides evidence that firms shop for the least stringent regulator. Similarly, 
there is a growing literature on shopping of rating agencies by issuers of mortgage backed securities (e.g., Bolton, 
Frexias and Shapiro, 2011). 6 
 
 
Finally, our work complements the empirical literature on the effects of banking regulation and 
supervision. Such work encompasses studies on the role of regulation and supervision in well-
established banking and financial sectors of developed economies (Jayaratne and Strahan, 1996; 
Berger and Hannan, 1998; Kroszner and Strahan, 1999), as well as in developing financial 
sectors across the globe.
9  
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the structure of US 
banking supervision and the data. Then, in Section 3, we highlight our empirical strategy. Next, 
in Section 4, we report our main results and robustness checks. In Section 5, we explore the 
likely sources of the differences in regulatory behavior reported. We discuss the wider 
applicability of our findings in Section 6 and Section 7 concludes. 
 
2.  US Banking Regulation, Alternating Supervision, and Data 
 
2.1 An Overview of US Banking Regulation 
The US banking industry has evolved into a complex and fragmented system that reflects 
America's historical tension between centralizing and decentralizing political forces. Since the 
National Bank Act of 1863, commercial banks have had to deal with a dual supervisory system, 
under which they are chartered and supervised both by federal and state-level entities.
10 This 
system has often been praised by policymakers as playing a key role in financial innovation, as 
federal and state regulating bodies compete with one another and thus trim unnecessary rules 
(Scott, 1977). In addition, commentators have argued that state regulators can leverage their local 
knowledge to improve their supervisory decisions. At the same time several policy makers and 
commentators have criticized the dual system for the resulting fragmentation of the banking 
sector and for the risk of a “competition for laxity” generated among bank regulators (for 
example Fed Chairman Arthur Burns, 1974). This latter issue has been actively debated in the 
past –most recently around the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999– and has again resurfaced in 
the aftermath of the 2008-09 crisis (see Senator Dodd’s speech in Senate Banking Committee 
hearing in September, 2009). 
 
In the current system banks can choose between a state and national charter. With a state charter, 
they can also decide whether or not to be members of the Federal Reserve System. The three 
different types of commercial bank charters correspond to three different primary federal 
regulators: the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), instituted in 1863; the Federal 
                                                            
9 The literature on the latter is vast. See Beck et al. (2000); Barth et al. (2004) among the others. 
10 Prior to 1863 state commercial banking was the primary form of banking. Commercial banks are the predominant 
form of depository institutions in the United States and are the focus of this paper.  The other two main classes of 
depository institutions are savings banks (also known as thrifts because they historically offered only savings 
accounts), which generally specialize in real estate lending and credit unions which are cooperative financial 
institutions. Among other types of depository institutions in the United States are the following: Edge corporations, 
branches and the branches and agencies of foreign banks. 7 
 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), instituted in 1933; and the Federal Reserve System 
(Fed), instituted in 1913. Federally chartered banks, also known as national banks (NA) are 
primarily supervised (and chartered) by the OCC. State banks are supervised by their chartering 
state banking departments, in conjunction with the Federal Reserve, if they are members of the 
Federal Reserve System (as we stated before, these banks are called state-member banks, SMBs). 
Otherwise, state banks are supervised by their respective chartering state banking departments 
along with the FDIC, since these banks are not a member of the Federal Reserve System (i.e., 
these banks are referred to as non-member banks, NMBs as we explained earlier). In general, the 
regulator that is in charge of regulating and supervising an entity is also a function of its line of 
business. Figure 1 depicts the structure of supervision and regulation for US commercial banks 
and thrifts. 
 
Until recently different charters implied notable differences in permissible activities as well as 
regulatory requirements. For example, through the early 1980s non-member banks were not 
subject to reserve requirements (according to the Depository Institutions Deregulation and 
Monetary Control Act of 1980), their lending limits could differ significantly across states, their 
ability to branch interstate differed, and the list of activities (e.g. providing insurance) that they 
were permitted was quite diverse. However, over the years, many of the differences across 
requirements and charters have disappeared as regulatory and charters have converged. Many 
commentators believe that the main drivers of charter choice now are direct regulatory costs and 
the bank’s perception of the regulator’s accessibility.
11 Small banks tend to prefer state charters, 
as applications are streamlined and supervisory fees are lower (Blair and Kushmeider (2006)). 
Larger banks, especially those that aim at branching inter-state, tend to prefer national charters 
(see, e.g., Bierce (2007)).
12 As of the first quarter of 2011, about 1,350 NAs accounted for 70 
percent of all commercial bank assets; about 800 SMBs accounted for about 15 percent of all 
banks assets, and around 4,200 NMBs accounted for the remaining 15 percent of all assets. 
 
Banking micro-prudential supervision in the United States relies on two main pillars: off- and 
on-site monitoring. Off-site monitoring requires all depository institutions to file quarterly 
“Reports of Condition and Income”, or Call Reports. Regulators use Call Reports to monitor a 
bank’s financial conditions between on-site examinations. On-site “safety and soundness” 
examinations are used to verify the content of Call Reports and to gather additional in-depth 
information regarding the safety and soundness of the supervised entity as well as its compliance 
with regulations. In an on-site examination, supervisors read additional documents from the 
bank, review and evaluate its loan portfolio, and meet with the bank’s management. Supervisors 
                                                            
11 Office of Inspector General (2002). For a cautionary tale concerning the OTS "accessibility" see Cyran (2009) and 
Office of Inspector General (2010).  In our sample for analysis, state banking departments often mention higher 
"accessibility" among the main advantages of a state charter versus a national one.  (See for example. 
http://www.banking.state.tx.us/corp/charter/benefits.htm )    
12 See Rosen (2003) for possible determinants of charter changes.  Blair and Kushmeider (2006) discuss the funding 
of supervisors. 8 
 
comment on areas that must be improved; and depending on the bank’s condition, they also 
discuss with management the need for informal or formal supervisory actions. Informal actions 
are established through a commitment from the bank to solve the deficiencies identified in the 
form of a memorandum of understanding or a bank board resolution. Formal actions are more 
severe. They include cease-and-desist orders, suspensions or removals of banks’ senior 
management, and terminations of insurance.  
 
These examinations culminate in the assignment by a team of examiners of a CAMELS rating, 
which, summarizes the conditions of the bank (broken down into six components—for capital 
adequacy, asset quality, management, earnings, liquidity, and sensitivity to market risk). Ratings 
for each of the six components and the final rating are on a 1 to 5 scale, with the lower numbers 
indicating fewer/and or lesser regulatory concerns. Banks with a rating of 1 or 2 are considered 
to present few (if any) significant regulatory concerns, whereas those with 3, 4, and 5 ratings 
present moderate to extreme levels of regulatory concerns.  
 
Not only are these ratings the central summary measure of banking supervision that is easily 
comparable, they are also relevant for several important policy decisions. In particular, 
CAMELS are used to determine decisions such as how high to set insurance premiums on 
deposit insurance by the FDIC, whether to lend credit to financial institutions by the Fed (lender 
of last resort), whether to make licensing, branching and merger approvals, and whether to allow 
banks to participate in government programs, like Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) and 
small business lending programs. 
 
2.2 Alternating US Banking Supervision: Policy and Coverage 
Since the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 federal bank 
supervisors are required to conduct on-site examinations every 12 months, unless their assets fall 
below a minimum threshold, in which case the exams are conducted every 18 months. This 
threshold has changed over time and since 2007 stands at $500 million for SMBs and NMBs 
(FRB (2008) and FDIC (2002)).
13 Federal supervisors had begun coordinating with state banking 
departments so that they could share examination results since the 1980s. Section 349 of the 
Riegle Community Development and Regulatory Improvement Act of 1994 required the Federal 
Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC) to issue guidelines for determining the 
acceptability of state examination reports as substitutes for federal examinations. 
 
The aim of these rules was to reduce the regulatory burden on state chartered banks under dual 
supervision system, by substituting a federal examination with a state examination. The rules 
were issued in Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (1995) and the Federal 
Reserve Board and the FDIC made a formal nationwide state/federal supervisory agreement with 
the Conference of State Bank Supervisors (CSBS), a national organization of participating state 
                                                            
13 See the US Code Title 12, §1820 (d. 3) for an explicit codification. 9 
 
bank regulators.
14 Since the issuance of Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council 
(1995), acceptable state reports became eligible substitutes for federal reports; that is, after the 
FFIEC rules were issued, federal and state regulators could take turns every 12 months (or 18 
months for smaller banks) examining state chartered banks. 
 
As noted previously, the FFIEC rules established that each federal regulator independently 
determines whether to accept the state examination results based on the type of reports produced 
by the state examiners, as well as measures of minimum state banking department budgets and 
the state banking department’s accreditation by the CSBS. The FDIC/Fed cooperative 
agreements cover the vast majority of states. As of 1995, both federal agencies separately had 
already entered into informal and formal arrangements, or working agreements, with most state 
banking departments, determining the types of banks that would be examined on an alternating 
independent basis or on a joint examination basis, among other matters.
15 While our results are 
quite insensitive to the choice of the starting period after the FFIEC guidelines of 1995 were 
issued, we do lack a precise date on which the policy starts operating. We conservatively allow 
for a one year breaking-in period and begin our analysis as of 1996:Q1 to ensure that 
idiosyncrasies in initial program implementation would disappear (e.g., the federal regulators 
could have preferred to let stronger banks start the rotation program first, allowing less robust 
institutions to join the rotation program later on). By 1996:Q1 rotations of supervisors across the 
vast majority of states are pervasive in the data. Our sample ends in 2011:Q1.   
 
Alternating examinations are not available for a subsample of banks. Only banks that at the most 
recent examination were assessed to have a composite CAMELS rating of either 1 or 2 are part 
of the alternating program. Only SMBs with an asset size of less than $10 billion are part of the 
program. In our sample of analysis, we focus on SMBs satisfying these criteria, since only for 
such banks is the supervisory rotation policy predetermined. The FDIC conducts alternating 
independent exams only for NMBs with an asset size of less than $250 million, representing 
more than 80 percent of all NMBs. Bank examinations of larger NMBs are run on a joint basis 
with the state examiner—in such cases, a mix of state and FDIC examiners participates in the on-
site visits. However, even in the case of joint NMB examinations, only one agency is the “lead 
agency” in assigning the CAMELS. We include such joint examinations in our sample, but our 
results are unaffected when excluding NMBs above $250 million.  
 
                                                            
14 These rules are summarized in Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (2002) and  Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System (2008)—two manuals for commercial bank examinations. 
15 Formal agreement dates by states are staggered over our sample period. According to Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (2004), all state banking departments with the exception of seven had signed formal cooperative 
agreements by 2004, with the number falling to four by 2007. In 2004, the state banking departments without formal 
agreements with federal regulators were in Alaska, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, South Dakota, 
and South Carolina. See http://www.csbs.org/development/accreditation/Pages/default.aspx .  See also Rezende 
(2010) for a discussion. 10 
 
We further filter the sample by excluding: targeted examinations as well as exams where all 
subcomponents of the CAMELS rating are not scored or available. We also exclude concurrent 
examinations because of their exceptional nature relative to the routine safety and soundness 
examinations which are our focus. Even when meeting all the preceding criteria for inclusion in 
our alternating supervision sample, we observe a small fraction (about 10 percent) of banks that 
do not display any rotation during our sample period. These banks with no signs of supervision 
rotation do not show up systematically within the sample—and they are spread out across states 
and over time. These banks appear to be mostly certain types of depository institutions with 
peculiar purposes (e.g. Industrial Loan Companies (ILCs)) or de novo banks.  Since these banks 
do not satisfy our condition for identification that requires exogenous rotation of regulators, we 
exclude them from our sample. We note, however, that our results are unaffected by including 
these specific banks in our analysis. 
 
2.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics on Rotation 
We use a unique dataset, the National Information Center of the Federal Reserve System, 
covering the time period from 1996 through 2010, of all on-site examination of safety and 
soundness conducted by banking regulators. The data contain detailed information about 
financial information of depository institutions, regulated and select non-regulated institutions, as 
well as other institutions that have a regulatory or reporting relationship with the Federal Reserve 
System. The key data for the purposes of this study are unique bank identifiers, the examiner 
identity (e.g. FDIC, Fed, States, OCC, and Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS)), the exam date, 
and most importantly the composite CAMELS rating and its components. In contrast to several 
papers that have explored the determinants of supervisory ratings at the bank holding level (e.g. 
Berger, Davies and Flannery, 1998), we employ the ratings at the level of the commercial bank, 
which is the entity level at which we observe the examiner rotations.  
 
We merge this information with balance sheet measures of bank profitability, profitability and 
asset quality from Call Reports. Our main Call Reports variables are: Tier1 risk-based capital 
ratio, leverage ratio (Tier1 capital as a share of total risk-unweighted assets), return on assets, 
share of non-performing loans to total loans, and the delinquency rate of the loan portfolio.  
Delinquent loans include loans 30+ days past due and loans in nonaccrual status, and 
nonperforming loans are 90+ delinquent and loans in nonaccrual status. In some of our analysis 
we will also dissect delinquency and nonperforming loans for various asset classes in a bank’s 
portfolio (e.g., commercial real estate, residential real estate, and commercial and industrial 
loans). 
 
Importantly for our analysis, we define a supervisory cycle as the time between when a regulator 
conducts its on-site examination and when the alternate regulator examines the bank, with the 
time period lasting either 12 or 18 months depending on the bank’s asset size (as discussed in 
Section 2.2). In our regressions, we use this definition to assess the relationship between changes 11 
 
in supervisor identity and CAMELS ratings as well as bank variables. Because the CAMELS 
rating does not change between exams, doing so captures how supervisory rating changes across 
different regulators. Bank balance sheet variables, instead, can vary each quarter. This implies 
that using our definition of supervisory cycle in this analysis compares the average effect on a 
variable across quarters following a federal or a state examination. We revert to this issue in 
Section 4.2. 
 
Summary statistics for our sample of rotating banks as of 1996:Q1 appear in Table 1. We present 
the descriptive statistics on CAMELS ratings, as well as bank balance-sheet measures such as 
delinquencies, non-performing loans, and ROA for both SMBs and NMBs split up by whether 
they were assigned to federal or state regulators at the start of our sample. These statistics 
provide sample moments that will be useful for interpreting the magnitude of our regression 
coefficients. 
 
We provide the length of duration between supervisory rotations in Table 2. A vast majority of 
banks display supervisory rotations between two and eight quarters. This description matches 
well the regulatory restriction of four-quarter to six-quarter rotations discussed earlier. In 
particular, NMBs are subject to less frequent examinations and rotations, about one every 18 
months. This is in line with the guidelines discussed earlier since NMBs tend to be smaller banks 
(mean assets size of NMBs in our sample in 1996:Q1 is $95 million). Being larger, SMBs are 
subject to standard 12-month rotations in most cases (mean assets size of SMBs in our sample in 
1996:Q1 is $160 million). We investigate the reasons for shorter rotation spells and find that they 
are mostly accounted for by institutions that exit our sample because of the large wave of bank 
mergers that occurred over the past 15 years. The relaxation of intrastate and interstate branching 
regulation (culminating in the Riegle-Neal Act of 1994) and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 
1999 were primary facilitators of this M&A wave, a trend that we find is unrelated to the timing 
of the supervisory rotation cycle.
16  
 
Regulation spells may also be shorter because of banks switching charters or relocating their 
operations (Rosen (2005)). These instances are fairly limited in the data, and similar to M&A 
activity, we find relocations and charter switches to be unrelated to the timing or identity of the 
supervisor in  rotation cycles. We also occasionally find idiosyncratic cases of longer rotation 
cycles, but their exclusion does not affect our results in any substantive way. Discussions with 
senior executives in supervision and regulation suggested that most of these idiosyncrasies might 
be due to staffing issues, both at the state and federal level.
17 Often a longer-than-expected 
                                                            
16 Prior research has investigated the reasons for this trend and found it to be reflective of the weakening of small 
bank special interests vis-à-vis large banks in light of the introduction of new technologies in lending and deposit-
taking. For a complete discussion see Kroszner and Strahan (1999). 
17 Examples included instances when the examiner assigned to a specific bank was on leave or vacation at the 
predetermined exam time and when the assigned examiner was still involved with on-site examinations at another 
institution. 12 
 
rotation time with one regulator would be offset by a subsequent shorter rotation time with the 
alternating regulator; this tendency to rebalance the rotation times would be in line with 
regulatory restrictions. Figure 2 reports the kernel densities of the rotation spells graphically, 
illustrating compliance to the rotation profiles required by law for SMBs and NMBs.  Our 
interviews with experts in banking supervision and regulation confirmed a strict implementation 
of the rotation policy that is consistent with this pattern. 
 
Finally, Table 1 also allows us to investigate the nature of assignment of banks to state versus 
federal regulators at the inception of the rotation policy. It reports t-tests for differences in means 
across federally and state regulated banks involved in the rotation process as of the first quarter 
of 1996. Broadly, we find that banks assigned to state regulators versus federal look similar in 
the cross-section at inception. We fail to reject equality of means in the vast majority of the 
controlling variables. Occasionally, Table 1 reports some differences along certain dimensions, 
indicating potential deviations from pure random assignment. In the SMB sample, we reject the 
equality of means for ROA alone; in the NMB sample we reject the null of equality of means for 
nonperforming loans, delinquency rates, and leverage. These cross-sectional differences are, 
however, quantitatively small. Figures 3 and 4 plot the kernel densities for characteristics of 
banks assigned to federal and state supervisors as of 1996:Q1 and confirm this to be the case –
the difference in the two densities are barely noticeable along any dimension. We find similar 
evidence after exploring successive dates right after 1996:Q1 as well. No variable displays 
systematic consistent breaks across banks assigned to federal versus state regulators. We do not 
report these results for brevity's sake. As we will elaborate in the next section, our identification 
strategy relies on predetermined within-bank variation of regulators and not on which regulator 
was assigned at the inception of the rotation policy. Nevertheless, the quasi-randomized nature of 
assignment of initial supervisors across banks lends further support to our empirical design. 
 
3.  Identification Strategy 
 
We now present our empirical model and describe our identification strategy. To  keep the 
identification as transparent as possible, consider a regulatory outcome variable of interest Yit 
(e.g. the composite CAMELS rating) to be linearly determined by a vector of characteristics of 
bank i at quarter t, Bit, and by the characteristics of the supervisor Sit at quarter t according to the 
following equation: 
 
                                          ,         
 
where we include bank-specific fixed effects  and quarter fixed effects . Let us consider 
within-bank/within-quarter deviations from averages to partial out the fixed effects. Representing 
these within deviations with lower-case variables and dropping bank-quarter indexes, we focus 
on the following equation:  13 
 
 
               ,             ( 1 )  
 
where  plays the role of classical measurement error deviations. In general, vector s may include 
regulator-specific characteristics, such as the competence of its team of examiners, the structure 
of its budget, the role of assessment fees and the degree of political pressure on the regulator. 
However, for simplicity's sake, let us assume that s is scalar, indicating the change in the identity 
of the regulator.  
 
Vector b may include variables endogenously set by the bank and can be split into observables, 
b1, such as changes in the bank's ROA, capital ratios and liquidity levels, or changes in the 
structure of the market the bank operates in, and unobservable shocks, b2, such as shifts in the 
management’s composition. Let us further assume     |     0  to maintain the exposition 
strictly focused on the selection problem.  
 
We can rewrite equation (1) as: 
 
                          .          ( 2 )  
 
Importantly, note that in equation (2) the unobserved error component becomes             . 
As we will argue, the structure of the error term can create bias in identification of  and    if 
banks self-select into regulatory settings. The nature of the problem is very similar to matching 
bias in empirical contract theory, as for instance studied by Ackerberg and Botticini (2002).
18 In 
empirical matching models that achieve identification, one needs to account for the principal-
agent matching equation, which in this context translates into modeling a regulator-bank 
selection equation.  
 
To illustrate the bias due to self-selection by banks, let us assume that the decision of choosing 
supervisor s by bank with characteristics b is linear: 
 
             ,             ( 3 )  
 
where u represents the idiosyncratic variation in the selection of a specific regulator. Equation 
(3) approximates how banks sort into specific regulatory environments depending on the type of 
the supervisor (Rosen(2005)). An example of equation (3) would be the choice by Countrywide 
Financial Corp. to become a thrift in 2007. As discussed in the Financial Crisis Inquiry 
                                                            
18 A main difference in our paper is our focus on selection issues arising both in changes and in levels, as opposed to 
selection arising in levels only. This excludes the possibility of using panel variation as a source of identification in 
our setting, while it is occasionally employed in matching models. See Ackerberg and Botticini (2002) for a 
discussion. 14 
 
Commission Report(2011, p. 174), Countrywide moved under OTS oversight because of the 
increased scrutiny on property appraisals under OCC and adverse views on Option ARMs voiced 
by the Fed (both the OCC and the Fed were Countrywide’s previous regulators).  
 
Equation (3) is also the source of the selection bias that would arise in the standard fixed-effects 
panel estimation of the parameter vector of interest [1,] in (2). That is, by regressing y on b1 
and s, both coefficients would be biased and inconsistently estimated due to      ,     0 .  
 
In our empirical setup, the identification is based on the availability of a policy p guaranteeing 
that, within a set of SMBs and NMBs with rotating regulators, equation (3) does not hold. 
Instead, the assignment of a new regulator is predetermined by the policy rule: 
 
            ,         ( 4 )  
 
where the following orthogonality condition holds: 
 
       |     0                         .      ( 5 )  
 
The error term,  , accounts for idiosyncratic shocks that may introduce variation in the 
implementation of the rotation policy, as discussed in the case of Figure 2. These include random 
events such as conflicting meeting schedules or other factors that lead to temporary 
unavailability of examiners. Our sample conditioning in (5) requires that we only examine 
depository institutions for which the regulator’s identity is predetermined. Conditional on the 
bank being a SMB or NMB, under (4) and (5) fixed-effects panel estimation of the parameter 
vector of interest [1,] in (2) is unbiased and consistently estimated.  
 
In principle, under (4) and (5), it is also possible to identify the effect of supervisor s on 
subsequent bank behavior b1 itself: 
 
              ,           ( 6 )  
 
where   represents idiosyncratic error deviations in bank behavior. More precisely,  can be 
consistently estimated, since (4) breaks the simultaneity of b and s implied by (3). Section 4.2 
discusses in detail the effect of s on the bank’s response outcomes. 
 
In Section 4.1 we will exploit only within-bank information and rely on the predetermined nature 
of the assignment rule p to obtain consistent estimates of the total effect of changing a regulator. 
The total effect includes both the direct structural parameter  in equation (2) and any indirect 
effect that regulation has on CAMELS rating by altering bank behavior (illustrated by equation 15 
 
(6) for instance). To see this clearly, replace (6) in (2). The reduced-form regression we estimate 
is equivalent to: 
 
                                        ( 7 )  
 
Here, the total effect of changing a regulator is     and it is consistently estimated in our setting. 
The advantage of estimating equation (7) rather than equation (2) is that it captures in a single 
estimate all the channels through which s matters for CAMELS rating: the direct effect   and the 
indirect effect    . More importantly, relative to estimating equation (2), estimating equation (7) 
does not suffer from potential misspecification problems due to the possible omission of relevant 
elements of the vector   .   
 
4.     Empirical Results 
4.1 Differences in Supervisory Ratings 
In this section, we exploit the predetermined assignment of regulators to SMBs and NMBs to 
assess the effect of a supervisor’s identity on the rating obtained by a depository institution. We 
start by investigating the nature of the differences in CAMELS ratings that state and federal 
regulators assign by estimating equation (7). 
 
Table 3 reports the results for our sample of SMB institutions, supervised alternately by Fed and 
state regulators. Table 4 follows a similar structure and reports results for our sample of NMB 
institutions, supervised alternately by FDIC and state regulators. We present results for both the 
composite CAMELS rating and for each of its six subcomponents. This allows us to detect 
possible deviations across the various dimensions scored, since state supervisors might 
emphasize different safety and soundness components relative to their federal counterparts. All 
our standard errors are clustered at the state level in order to correct for both between-bank-
within-state and within-bank serial correlation in the error term.  
 
Column (1) in Tables 3 and 4 presents the results for composite CAMELS ratings in a fixed-
effects regression and shows that a dummy variable for the presence of a federal regulator as the 
lead agency supervising the bank is positive and statistically significant. These results appear 
extremely consistent and homogenous across CAMELS rating components, as shown in 
Columns (2) through (7) of both tables, and suggest that federal regulators systematically assign 
higher CAMELS ratings to a bank. Recall that higher CAMELS scores indicate worse 
assessments of the bank, implying that federal regulators are unambiguously tougher than state 
regulators across all safety and soundness components. We conduct several robustness tests, but 
our results remain stable (e.g., dropping the 5 percent tails of the distribution of banks along 




To gauge the economic magnitudes of our findings in the panel regressions presented in Tables 3 
and 4 we need to account for the high persistence of the CAMELS ratings. CAMELS ratings do 
not vary frequently for a bank and rating changes most likely incorporate substantial information. 
One sensible approach is to compare our within-bank coefficient estimates around the rotation 
with the within-bank standard deviation of the CAMELS rating (or its components) provided in 
the tables. As can be observed from Column (1) in both the tables, the effects are very large. In 
particular, the effect of a switch from a state regulator to the Fed is about a third of the within-
SMB standard deviation. Similarly, the switch from a state regulator to the FDIC results in about 
a fifth of the within-NMB standard deviation. The impact of switching to a federal regulator is 
the largest for the Management and the Sensitivity to risk components of the CAMELS rating.  
 
Another (more intuitive) way of displaying the magnitudes of the results in Tables 3 and 4 is to 
analyze simple raw frequencies of changes in CAMELS ratings around the rotation. In other 
words, conditional on observing a change in the CAMELS rating—in essentially all cases equal 
to one notch in magnitude in our data—we  can ask which agency is more likely to downgrade 
(i.e., reporting a CAMELS increase) or upgrade (i.e., reporting a CAMELS drop). The results of 
this simple tabulation exercise are reported in Table 5 for both SMBs and NMBs. The difference 
between state and federal regulators is striking. Both Fed and FDIC are about twice as more 
likely than their state counterparts to downgrade a commercial bank. For SMBs, 76 percent of 
the downgrades originate from the Fed and only 24 percent from the state regulator. For NMBs, 
65 percent of the downgrades originate from the FDIC and only 35 percent from the state 
regulator. Notably, the Fed is also less likely to upgrade relative to the average state regulator 
(only 43 percent of SMB upgrades are Fed-originated), although the FDIC is more likely to 
upgrade than the state regulator (58 percent of NMB upgrades are FDIC-originated). Hence, 
while the Fed appears unambiguously more stringent than its average state counterpart, the FDIC 
displays more stringency in downgrading only.  
 
In addition, state regulators do not appear to completely counteract federal regulators' activity. 
The frequency of federal regulators' downgrades is substantially higher than the frequency of 
state regulators' upgrades. Raw frequencies indicate that state regulators' assessments appear to 
mostly stabilize around federal regulators' assessments instead. Finally, federal regulators 
consistently display: a) a similar degree of stringency across all subcomponents of the CAMELS 
ratings, as reported in Appendix Table 2; b) no differential behavior for banks that eventually 
end up in the problem bank list (defined as banks with CAMELS ratings of 4 or 5); and c) no 




19 Appendix Table 3 reports the same decomposition of CAMELS rating increases (bank downgrades) and 
CAMELS rating increases (bank upgrades) as Table 5, but limited to banks that end up in the future as problem 
banks. State regulators are only slightly more likely to downgrade a problem bank (29 percent for SMB, 38 percent 
for NMB) relative to what they do in the case of the average bank in Table 5 (24 percent for SMB, 35 percent for 
NMB) vis-à-vis federal regulators. 17 
 
 
We confirm that the results of simple tabulations in Table 5 are statistically significant and 
robust by employing specifications that condition on bank and quarter fixed effects. Table 6 
presents results from a linear probability model where the dependent variable is 1 for a 
CAMELS rating decrease and 0 otherwise in columns (1) and (2) and the dependent variable is 1 
for a CAMELS rating increase and 0 otherwise in columns (3) and (4). The higher propensity of 
a downgrade to originate from a federal regulator is robust to the inclusion of bank and quarter 
fixed effects and very precisely estimated. With the admitted caveat of a large frequency of zeros 
in these regressions (due to the serial correlation in the CAMELS ratings discussion earlier), 
magnitudes in these specifications suggest effects of the order of 10-25 percent within-bank 
standard deviations. In contrast, the propensities to upgrade are an order of magnitude smaller. 
 
A final caveat is in order. Regressions involving regulatory outcomes, such as the CAMELS 
rating regressions presented in this section, could potentially suffer from the omission of 
dynamic interactions between regulators. Our estimates could be affected by the omission of 
expectations of federal regulators about subsequent behavior of state regulators. For instance, 
federal regulators could decide to preemptively downgrade the rating in expectation of a more 
lenient future cycle under state regulators, even if conditions do not warrant it yet. No direct 
evidence of dynamic interaction appeared obvious in our extensive checks in the data. For 
example, a downgrade by a federal regulator did not appear to predict either an upgrade or a 
downgrade by the state supervisor in charge of the following examination cycle. While our 
choice of exclusion of future/alternative regulators’ characteristics from equation (1) was based 
on such evidence, it is, however, important to discuss the likely econometric issues arising from 
such an omission. Under a more general statistical model where these dynamic effects were at 
play, the structural parameter vector of interest [1,] in (2) would be consistently recoverable 
from the data only if information on the exact nature of the dynamic interaction across regulators 
became available. Nonetheless, absent such information, the estimated coefficients on b1 and s 
would still represent consistent reduced-form equilibrium effects of bank behavior and the 
supervisor’s identity. We limit ourselves to such an interpretation here. 
 
4.2 Do Supervisors Affect Bank Behavior? 
Are changes in the identity of a regulator detectable along explicit dimensions of bank behavior? 
In this section, we investigate banks’ short-term response to the heightened threat of a 
downgrade stemming from a federal supervisor documented previously. This is an important step 
in the assessment of the potential real economic consequences of regulatory idiosyncrasies on 
overseen entities. We employ information from Call Reports to formally test this proposition 




More specifically, we employ within-bank variation to assess whether the Fed and FDIC 
effectively impose more stringent capital and liquidity conditions on depository institutions than 
the average state supervisor. Our specification mirrors equation (7) with now the dependent 
being bank balance sheet variables rather than CAMELS ratings. As discussed above, it is 
important to reiterate that we define a supervisory cycle as the time between when a regulator 
conducts its on-site examination and when the alternate regulator examines the bank. This allows 
us to track actions undertaken by banks following the examination.  Since bank variables can 
potentially change every quarter, our specification now compares the average effect on a variable 
across quarters following a federal or a state examination.  
 
One may reasonably conjecture that, in addition to imposing stricter ratings, federal regulators 
may impose more stringent capital allocations, i.e., higher capital imposition (such as higher 
Tier1 RBCR) and better governance, i.e., explicit booking of past delinquent and nonperforming 
loans, all at the expense of returns (i.e., resulting in lower ROA).
20 The data support the view that 
bank behavior is affected in ways consistent with this conjecture.  
 
Panel A in Table 7 reports empirical evidence for the SMB sample and Panel B for the NMB 
sample. The rotation from a state regulator to a federal regulator (Fed or FDIC) unambiguously 
produces an increase in Tier1 RBCR and the regulatory leverage ratio (defined as Tier1 capital 
divided by total risk-unweighted assets in Call Reports), a drop in ROA, and an increase in 
delinquent and nonperforming loans booked by the depository institution. All coefficients of 
interests are precisely estimated, with the exception of delinquency rates in the NMB sample.  
Given the short-term nature of the changes due to the length of the rotations, the economic 
magnitudes of these estimates are reasonable with effects ranging between 3 percent and 8 
percent of a within-bank standard deviation per extra quarter of federal regulator oversight.  
 
We further analyze the nature of bank asset portfolio and components of ROA that are affected 
by the stricter governance imposed by federal regulators. In particular, in Appendix Table 4 we 
analyze the nature of delinquencies and non-performing loans when we break the loan portfolio 
of banks into real estate loans – commercial and residential – and commercial and industrial 
loans (C&I). We find that the change in delinquency and non-performing loans documented in 
Table 4 is mainly driven by a change in real estate loans (both commercial and residential), while 
there is only limited variation in C&I loan quality around rotations. In addition, we also examine 
the components of ROA that contribute to its change in Table 7. We find that increases in the 
provision for loan loss and non-interest expenses largely contribute to this change.
21 We interpret 
                                                            
20Capital ratios can be influenced through changes in the allowance for loan and lease losses. There is a large 
literature that documents bank discretion in booking losses on its loan portfolio and the factors that influence such 
behavior. For instance, see Caballero, Hoshi and Kashyap (2008) for Japanese banks and Kane (1989) and Kroszner 
and Strahan (1996) for US banks. 
21 Salaries are the main component of non-interest expense.  An increase of salaries expenses is consistent with the 
bank taking corrective actions on its risk assessment by hiring new and/or more skilled staff. 19 
 
these results as reflective of federal regulators using their supervisory authority (through formal 
or informal actions as discussed in Section 2.1) to make banks take corrective actions for the 
problems highlighted in their examinations. 
 
There is an important remark to be made about the quantitative interpretation of these bank 
behavior results. Effects in Table 7 should be considered downward-biased estimates of the 
direct effect of federal regulators on bank behavior. The reason is the nearly-deterministic nature 
of the rotation rule, which allows banks to preemptively respond to changes in S.  
 
More formally, equation (6) which describes the effect of a supervisor on bank behavior needs to 
also account for the expectation of future rotations. To show the exact nature of the problem, we 
present a simple formalization where only the identity of the current regulator and the identity of 
the regulator in the following examination cycle matters. In particular, let us assume: 
 
                     ,          (6’)     
 
where the prime represents the next rotation period when the new regulator takes over. This 
clearly imposes a dynamic structure not captured by (6). Making use of the condition     1   , 
the behavioral response by the bank becomes: 
 
                      .             
 
In the simple dynamic setting (6’), regressing observed bank behavioral variables b1 on the 
current regulator’s identity s will likely produce biased estimates of the structural parameter of 
interest . Intuitively, anticipation of the future rotation cycles may dampen the response of a 
bank to the regulator currently supervising it. 
 
One alternative to solve this estimation problem would be to rely on strong structural 
assumptions of the type (6’) and consistently estimate the structural parameters ( and  in this 
case) while assuming the model is correct. It is difficult, however, to find explicit guidance on 
the exact nature of the dynamic response of a bank to future supervision, making results from 
this exercise model-dependent. An alternative, more reliable, approach is to limit the 
interpretation of the estimated coefficient on s in equation (6) to the reduced-form equilibrium 
effect of the underlying dynamic model and to recognize that we are focusing on a reduced-form 
effect, such as -, and not on  directly. Importantly, given the predetermined nature of s, such 
reduced-form coefficients remain consistently estimated even in presence of anticipatory effects.  
 
In Table 8 we further highlight this point econometrically by running a close equivalent to 
specification (6’). This specification includes a dummy indicator equal to 1 if the lead agency in 
the (current) quarter t is federal and 0 otherwise (similar to Table 7 Panel A and Panel B). More 20 
 
importantly, these specifications also include two additional indicator variables: one that takes a 
value 1 if a federal supervisor replaces the current state supervisor at quarter t+1 (0 otherwise) 
and another that takes a value 1 if a federal supervisor replaces the current state supervisor at t+2 
(0 otherwise). If the coefficients on these additional dummies display the identical sign as the 
effect of having a federal supervisor in the current quarter, one may conclude that there is 
evidence of anticipatory action on the part of the bank. To understand why, suppose that at time 
t=0 a bank expects to be required to increase its Tier1 capital by a federal regulator scheduled to 
examine it on site two quarters after. Since raising Tier1 capital on a short notice may be costly, 
the bank is likely to attempt to raise it ahead of the regulatory switch, which would help make 
the bank’s adjustment to the new regulator go more smoothly. This may induce the bank to 
increase its Tier1 capital not only at period t= 2, when the new regulator actually comes in, but 
possibly also at t= 1 and t= 0, even if the current regulator has no particular concerns about 
Tier1.  
 
Panel A and Panel B of Table 8 display the dynamics of anticipating changes on account of a 
switch from state supervision to federal supervision by SMBs and NMBs, respectively. 
Anticipatory motives are evident in Tier1 RBCR, leverage ratio, and non-performing loans and 
delinquencies among SMBs expecting Fed to supervise them in next cycle or two; additionally, 
such motives appear in ROA of SMBs and NMBs scheduled for federal supervision.
22  
 
4.3 Is Lenient Supervision Costly? 
This section presents a first attempt at assessing whether more lenient behavior displayed by 
state regulators – their lower willingness to initiate downgrades across banks in our sample (and 
higher willingness to initiate upgrades for SMBs) – can be interpreted as a desirable feature.  
 
On the one hand, excessive regulatory strictness may stifle innovation of the banking sector, 
thereby hampering growth of the corporate sector, as some have argued. On the other hand, 
excessive regulatory leniency may be the telltale sign of regulatory capture and lead to excessive 
risk-taking, as others have contended (see Scott (1977) for a discussion of both views). Both 
arguments have been reiterated in the debate around regulatory failures during the build-up to the 
2008–09 financial crisis. However, to our knowledge there is no empirical evidence 
systematically evaluating either of these claims. Here we take a step in this direction and provide 
a tentative assessment of the issue. 
 
We start by examining the correlation between the strictness of federal regulators relative to their 
state counterparts–henceforth, the ‘federal-state spread’–and an outcome that is considered 
unambiguously negative within financial markets: bank failures. Such failures hamper the proper 
functioning of the financial system and can stall real economic activity (Calomiris and Gorton, 
                                                            
22 Notice that this econometric approach is not needed when studying CAMELS ratings. The reason is that 
CAMELS ratings can only change in the quarter of the on-site examination conducted by the new regulator. 21 
 
1991).
23 Notice that it is not obvious whether the relative leniency of a state regulator would 
manifest itself in a higher failure or problem-bank rate in that state. On the one hand, even if 
state regulators are lenient, corrective actions by federal regulators –if implemented– should 
improve the health of a bank and reduce its chances of failure. On the other hand, it might be the 
case that state regulatory laxity slows down corrective actions by the Fed or FDIC, thereby 
increasing the chances of a bank failing in that state. 
 
We use data on bank failure rates and problem-bank (i.e., banks close to failing) rates over our 
sample period to conduct our analysis.
24 To streamline the presentation of the results and gain 
statistical power, we pool federal regulators together in this and the following sections.
25 Panel A 
of Table 9 presents the results using the baseline specification of Table 3 and 4 and using the 
composite CAMELS rating as the dependent variable. The federal agency indicator in Table 9 is 
interacted with whether or not the state is above or below the cross-state median in terms of bank 
failure rate (column 1) and problem-bank rate (column 2). The coefficients suggest that, for 
banks in our sample, federal regulators always imposes higher CAMELS ratings than the state 
regulator (hence, the state is more lenient on average), but the federal regulator does this even 
more so in states with high bank-failure rates and high problem-bank rates. The null hypothesis 
that there are no differences in coefficients across the two groups is rejected statistically in chi-
square tests for both bank failure rate (p=0.001) and problem-bank rate (p=0.014). 
  
We find qualitatively similar results in Panel B of Table 9 where we estimate a cross-sectional 
regression of bank-failure rates in a given state on the federal-state spread for the CAMELS 
rating that is estimated over the entire sample period. In column (1), we report the results for all 
the states in our sample. The federal-state spread is positively associated with the bank-failure 
rate in that state. In other words, states where bank-failure rates are high are also those where 
state regulators appear less willing to apply strict ratings relative to their federal counterparts. 
The economic magnitudes suggested by the coefficients are large – a one standard deviation 
movement in the federal-state spread (0.07) is associated with about 40 percent increase in the 
bank failure rates relative to the mean rate across states. In column (2), we restrict our sample to 
states with more than 20 banks to improve the precision of our estimated federal-state spread. 
The results become both quantitatively and statistically stronger. For the sake of completeness, 
we also conduct the cross-sectional analysis using the problem-bank rate as the dependent 
variable and find results that are qualitatively similar (unreported for brevity's sake). 
  
                                                            
23 While bank failures are an important element in banking supervision and frequently discussed in the context of 
banking crises, policymakers are also interested in ensuring that credit is allocated efficiently in the economy. For 
instance, if policymakers wanted, they could eliminate banking failures through a very high reserve requirement; 
however, this would substantially affect credit allocation.  
24 Problem banks are identified using the criterion employed by regulators; i.e., banks that have composite CAMELS 
ratings of 4 and 5, as defined in the FDIC problem bank list. 
25 There are also legal constraints we face in trying to explore the heterogeneity of effects across different federal 
agencies. 22 
 
Our final point in this section involves considering potential benefits forgone by reducing 
regulatory leniency. One prominent cost that might result from excessive regulatory stringency 
could be a reduction in the credit supply in the economy. This question can be assessed within 
the setting presented in Section 4.2. Table 10 presents estimates of the impact of supervisor 
identity on a bank’s growth of new loans in the short run. The estimated effects are both 
quantitatively and statistically insignificant. These findings suggest that vis-à-vis state regulators, 
more-stringent federal regulators do not appear to limit credit supply. 
 
We note here that, while the results in this section are novel, the evidence is partially suggestive. 
Our results on bank failure and problem-bank rates do not benefit from the identification strategy 
of Section 3, while our results on credit supply do. Admittedly, interpreting the bank failure and 
problem-bank rates results causally would require strong assumptions on how the federal-state 
spreads are assigned across states.  
 
4.4 Additional Results and Robustness 
In this subsection we present additional results by extending some of our findings and providing 
robustness checks. For brevity we limit the analysis to composite CAMELS ratings. 
 
Market Discipline: Public versus Private Banks 
A recurring discussion among economists and policymakers alike revolves around whether 
complementarities exist between market discipline and regulation (Brunnermeier et al., 2009). In 
our context, one could expect that publicly traded companies –with more stringent requirements 
of information disclosure and formal external governance and scrutiny– would be more likely to 
part from the regulatory idiosyncrasies found earlier.  
 
We investigate this issue and present our results in Table 11. We use a specification similar to 
that used in Panel A of Table 9 with the difference being that here we interact the federal agency 
indicator with dummies for whether the bank is publicly traded or privately held. Our results 
suggest that the difference in the federal-state spreads for CAMELS ratings is significantly 
smaller for publicly traded entities than for private banks. Notwithstanding the inherent 
complexity of publicly traded banks, which are more likely to be large and intricate entities, 
there appear to be a convergence in assessments of both state and federal regulators for publicly 
traded banks.  While we recognize that a plethora of omitted variables could potentially be 
driving these results, it is interesting to note that such convergence arises precisely in the 
presence of market-generated knowledge. This finding is broadly consistent with Beck, 
Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine (2003), who find that a supervisory strategy that empowers private 





Pre and Post Financial Crisis 
Table 12 focuses on the structural change in US banking supervision occurring around the recent 
financial crisis. The financial turmoil brought an unprecedented amount of attention to the role of 
federal regulators, especially the Fed and the FDIC. In Table 12 we are able to rebut the 
hypothesis that the results discussed in Section 4.1 may be entirely driven by the recent crisis, 
during which both the Fed and FDIC acquired much more activist roles in both nonsupervisory 
and supervisory areas. We check for changes in the behavior of federal regulators by comparing 
the federal-state spreads during the crisis with the spreads during the period before it. Table 12 
presents specifications similar to those in Table 11, with the difference being that we interact the 
federal agency indicator with dummies for the pre-crisis (2000-06) and crisis periods (2007-09). 
The difference in the federal-state spreads for CAMELS ratings is significantly smaller in the 
pre-crisis period, but remains positive and highly statistically significant across both sample 
periods. We can only speculate about the sources of the stronger divergence in composite 
CAMELS ratings assigned by federal versus state regulators during the crisis; however, the fact 
that greater attention was paid to the actions of federal regulators appears a reasonable 
explanation for the divergence. 
 
Regional Heterogeneity    
We now investigate the extent of regional heterogeneity in the federal-state spreads. Our goal is 
to exclude the possibility that our results may be driven by a specific subset of states or by a 
specific regional district of the prudential supervisor.
26 To evaluate heterogeneity across states, 
we propose a simple extension of the specification (7) that permits a different dummy for the 
federal regulator depending on the specific state that bank i belongs to. In essence, instead of a 
single federal-state dummy Sit, which compares federal regulators with the average state 
regulator, we estimate 50 different federal-state contrasts. This allows us to assess whether the 
federal regulators appear tougher than state regulators across the vast majority of states or if a 
small subset of states with state regulators that are more lenient than federal regulators is driving 
our results.  Figure 5 reports the coefficients on the state dummy variables interactions for the 
federal regulators with their 5 percent confidence intervals. In this figure we plot a dashed line 
which illustrates the average state behavior under a specification analogous to column (1) of 
Tables 3 and 4. To make the interactions meaningful we only report states with more than 10 
banks. Figure 5 displays precisely estimated effects that are overwhelmingly above zero –i.e. the 
federal regulators systematically assign higher CAMELS than specific states' regulators. Notice, 
however, that certain states appear less lenient than others and some even tougher than federal 
regulators (below zero).  
 
We also examined the heterogeneity within federal regulators by following an analogous 
procedure. The specification in this case compared each federal regulator in its different regional 
                                                            
26 Both Fed and FDIC prudential supervision activities are in fact organized by geographical divisions—specifically, 
by 12 regional Federal Reserve Districts and eight FDIC Regions. 24 
 
districts against the “average” state regulator in that regional jurisdiction. We do not report these 
results for brevity’s sake, but we note here that no particular regional district appears to be 
driving our results.    
 
5.      Why the Difference among Regulators? 
 
Our findings so far have highlighted substantial differences both in the behavior of state versus 
federal regulators and in the behavior of banks as a result of the rotation of prudential 
supervisors. However, we have not presented any evidence suggesting what the likely sources of 
this heterogeneity are. In this section, we investigate this issue. 
 
One reason for a softer stance by state supervisors could be that they are captured by the 
constituents they supervise. Since Stigler (1971) and Peltzman (1976), economists have argued 
that constituents being regulated exert pressure on their regulators for their benefit by applying 
influence. In the context of banking, it is well documented that a majority of states finance their 
prudential supervision efforts through the use of assessment fees proportional to bank assets 
(Blair and Kushmeider (2006)). As a result, large banks hold a disproportionate weight in the 
existence of state supervision, since they represent the largest revenue source for the state 
regulator itself.
27 In addition, because relocation and charter-switch costs are largely fixed, large 
banks are also more likely to escape state regulator controls, vis-à-vis smaller banks. 
Incidentally, this assessment fee structure is not just a feature of state banking regulators, but 
also of federal ones, such as the OCC and the (former) OTS. The Fed and the FDIC, however, 
are federal regulators not funded through assessment fees and they receive no payment from 
member or nonmember banks for their on-site examinations. It may be the case that, although 
states might be exposed to political capture, the Fed and the FDIC might be immune to such 
pressure from state constituents. 
 
We explore this conjecture by assessing whether the importance of large banks for regulatory 
survival of some state regulators may induce these regulators to be more lenient. The results of 
our analysis are presented in Table 13. We follow a stringent approach and use within-bank 
variation - this limits the power of our analysis because of the fact that large banks tend to 
remain large (and generally bank size is very persistent). Specifically, we estimate our baseline 
specification (7) including a control for the bank being in the top quartile of the size distribution 
in the state and an interaction of the size percentile with the federal regulator dummy. As before, 
we find that state regulators are more lenient than federal regulators. However, we also find that 
state regulators tend to be even more lenient when dealing with larger banks. The coefficient on 
the interaction is statistically significant and positive and about one third of the average 
                                                            
27 It is important to note that even if state regulators charge for exams, such resources may not be necessarily 
earmarked for bank supervision and may accrue to a general fund. This does not exclude that state regulators may 
still care about the size and relevance of the entities overseen, for instance to justify budgetary and personnel 
appropriations.   25 
 
difference in CAMELS ratings between federal and state regulators. These results suggest to us 
that state regulators may be showing some preferential treatment toward the large banks in their 
jurisdiction (relative to the small ones).  
 
Finally, states differ in their banking regulatory philosophy, the characteristics of resources who 
implement the regulation, and the type of goals they set for their state bank charters. Indeed, this 
variety in approach is often cited as a major advantage of the US dual banking system (American 
Bankers Association (2009)). We assess here whether this variety plays a role in explaining 
regulatory behavior. We focus on how the federal-state spread for CAMELS rating is related to 
some of the measurable characteristics of the state supervisory system, using data from the 
biannual Profile of State Bank Supervisor (Conference of State Bank Supervisors) for years 
1996, 1998, 2000, 2002 and 2004. We concentrate on three aspects of each state's supervisory 
system: (a) the percentage of the budget spent in staff training; (b) the ratio of the number of 
commercial bank examiners to number of SMB and NMB in the state; and (c) the percentage of 
commercial bank examiners with more than five years of experience.
28 In our analysis we follow 
the specification similar to that of Table 11, with the difference that the federal agency indicator 
is interacted with dummy variables that identify whether a given state regulator is below or 
above the cross-state median for each of these variables.  
 
Table 14 reports the results. Relative to the federal regulator, state regulators with lower 
expenditure on staff training display more-lenient behavior when it comes to downgrading 
CAMELS rating of banks. While this difference is potentially interesting, the evidence lacks 
statistical power. The null hypothesis of no differences in coefficients across the two groups 
cannot be rejected at the 10 percent level. As shown in the last set of tests in this table, we also 
find that states with a higher number of examiners per bank and a higher share of experienced 
examiners appear more lenient relative to their federal regulator. Both these effects are 
statistically significant at the 10 percent confidence level. These findings are interesting because 
having more examiners per bank and having a greater share of higher tenured examiners should 
reflect better resources for supervising banks. However, having more examiners per bank and a 
more tenured staff may also imply higher chances of being captured by the regulated entities. 
This may occur because examiners are likely to specialize when there are more examiners 
interacting with a few banks. In addition, future career opportunities at regulated entities are 
more likely for examiners with higher tenure. 
 
 
6.     How broadly applicable are these findings? 
 
                                                            
28 Each measure is computed using data for each year and then averaged.  Data on the percentage of the budget spent 
on staff training is only available in 2002 and 2004.  Information on the number (and tenure) of the examiners is 
missing for 2004. 26 
 
In this section, we examine the correlation between supervisor identity and CAMELS ratings and 
its subcomponents across all federal regulators in a broader universe of banks, including national 
banks and thrifts, over the same time period. The objective of this analysis is two-fold. First, the 
comparison of the behavior of federal regulators (Fed and FDIC) with that of state regulators in 
the larger sample relative to this comparison in the rotation sample allows us to discuss the size 
of the bias that bank sorting creates in any empirical analysis that ignores this issue. As discussed 
before, this sorting occurs since banks actively shop for regulators who are likely to be softer on 
them through different channels such as supervisory ratings (see Rezende, 2011). Second, this 
exercise will also allow us to make some assessments of how broadly applicable our findings 
might be for all US commercial banks. 
 
Table 15 includes all depository institutions in the Fed’s NIC universe and examines the 
correlation between CAMELS rating changes and the supervisor identity of all regulators. Since 
banks in this sample differ dramatically both in terms of observables (e.g., ROA, Tier-1 capital 
ratio, leverage) and unobservables (e.g., factors that prompt self-selection into a charter), it is 
hard to make direct comparisons across regulators. Nevertheless, in this naïve analysis, we can 
still condition on bank balance sheet variables that capture its health such as its ROA, Tier 1 
capital ratio, and its asset size. In the pooled OLS regression of column (1) we focus on Fed and 
FDIC coefficients, which, as in Tables 3 and 4, are contrasts against the average state regulatory 
behavior (the excluded category). The estimated coefficients appear quantitatively and 
statistically larger than what is estimated in column (1) of Tables 3 and 4 for the Fed and FDIC, 
respectively. The likely reason for this upward bias is that banks sorting into SMB or NMB 
status do so for an advantage, which may well include state regulator leniency. If banks looking 
for leniency on the part of state regulators are also the ones most likely to trigger severe scrutiny 
on the part of federal regulators (as a quest for leniency may indicate worse conditions), then this 
can explain the increase in the Fed/state and FDIC/state spreads when such selection is not 
accounted for. 
 
In columns (2) through (4), we exploit within-quarter and within-bank variation to make the 
pooled analysis progressively more comparable to the one conducted in Tables 3 and 4. As is 
evident from the results, state regulators tend to be more lenient relative to all federal regulators 
with the exception of the OTS. In particular, note that the federal regulators we analyzed earlier 
(the Fed and FDIC) still appear to be tougher than state regulators. By column (4), which 
includes both bank and quarter fixed effects, the magnitudes of the estimates of the strictness of 
the Fed and FDIC relative to state regulators are similar to those found in Section 4.1. This 
suggests that, while self-selection is an important issue in the pooled cross-sectional sample, 
conditioning on unobserved time-invariant components is sufficient to isolate the treatment 
effect of supervisor identity. The similarity across the estimates in column (1) of Tables 3 and 4 
and column (4) of Table 15 suggests that the unobservables driving sorting might not be time-
varying, but fixed. We believe this is a relevant contribution to the literature on regulatory 27 
 
shopping and bank sorting. Inclusion of bank and quarter fixed effects appears a sufficient 
correction to account for regulatory shopping. Importantly, this assessment is only possible 
because of the availability of our earlier results employing a well-identified causal benchmark.  
 
7.     Conclusion and Discussion 
 
The main contribution of this paper lies in an assessment of the structure of US dual banking 
supervision by examining the nature and consequences of supervisory decisions. This is a hard 
empirical endeavor largely due to the difficulty in separating regulatory arbitrage by banks from 
the real influence of bank supervisors. Self-selection by banks is not just a theoretical possibility. 
This issue has been prevalent in the policy and academic debate (e.g., see Rezende, 2011).We 
circumvent this challenge by exploiting a legally determined rotation policy that assigns federal 
and state supervisors to same banks at predetermined time intervals. We find that federal 
regulators are significantly less lenient, downgrading supervisory ratings about twice as 
frequently as state supervisors. As a consequence of these actions, under federal regulators, 
banks report higher non-performing loans, more delinquent loans, higher regulatory capital 
ratios, and lower ROA.  
 
While the paper falls short of providing a definitive answer as to whether the US dual 
supervisory system is optimal, to our knowledge, it clearly documents inconsistent 
implementation of the same set of rules by different regulators within this system. This is a 
consequential finding since inconsistencies between regulators can delay corrective regulatory 
actions. Our results also indicate that leniency by state regulators may also be costly since it 
induces variability in bank operations. Moreover, this may potentially reduce the transparency of 
bank balance-sheets for agents in the economy who are unaware of the source of this variability. 
 
Our paper speaks to the debate on supervision and regulation of banks prompted by the recent 
financial crisis. The 2008-09 crisis has made it clear that regulating and supervising complex and 
interconnected financial institutions requires significant coordination across regulators. An 
opposing view is the notion that dual supervision enhances the nature of decision making since it 
allows for state supervisors, who use local knowledge, to compete with federal supervisors, who 
rely on broader perspective. Our findings on inconsistent oversight and on bank failures cast 
serious doubt on this view and instead suggest a re-evaluation of the exact nature of benefits of 
the US dual supervision system. 
 
As we contemplate the regulatory reforms currently being proposed, it is vital to consider the 
structure of regulation that they may engender. Federal Reserve Chairmen (Bernanke, 2010; 
Greenspan, 1997) have argued that supervisory activities provide significant information useful 
to carry out monetary policy decisions (also see Goodhart 2001 for Fed's role as a lender of last 
resort or the FDIC's role in setting premia on deposit insurance). That said, some critics want 28 
 
federal regulators removed from day-to-day regulatory and supervisory authority, since their 
“other responsibilities” might adversely impact their supervisory decisions. Our results suggest 
that, while other roles may make federal regulators more lenient in absolute terms, their 
supervisory decisions appear significantly less lenient relative to their current state regulatory 
counterparts. 
 
Finally, this paper also speaks to other regulated industries such as insurance. While currently 
regulated solely at the state level, Congress has on several occasions introduced proposals for a 
“federal charter” for insurance companies.
29 The notion is that it would “help streamline and 
modernize the antiquated and patchwork system of state insurance regulation” and would parallel 
the current dual banking supervisory system.
30 We see our results on heterogeneous regulatory 
oversight –with more stringent federal regulators– as informative on the potential consequences 
of such reforms.   
                                                            
29 In the 110th Congress H.R. 3200, US Representatives Melissa Bean (D-IL) and Ed Royce (R-CA) presented 
National Insurance Act of 2007 advocating an optional federal charter for insurance companies.  Senator John 
Sununu (R-NH) and Senator Tim Johnson (D-SD) had previously co-sponsored the National Insurance Act of 2006 
with a similar goal.  
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Table 1: Summary Statistics of State Member Banks and Non-state Member Banks 
 
SMBs 
Rotating SMB, starting FED  Rotating SMB, starting STATE 
Bank variables, 1996:Q1 N  Mean SD N  Mean SD t-stat 
Non performing to loans  437  0.849  0.894  360  1.018  1.202  (-2.27) 
Delinquency  rate  437  2.425 1.753  360  2.838 2.254  (-2.90) 
ROA  438  0.307 0.134  360  0.304 0.139  (0.30) 
% growth in loans   436  1.809  5.805  356  1.736  5.895  (0.17) 
Leverage ratio  437  9.643  2.706  360  10.062  2.803  (-2.1) 
Tier1  RBCR  437  15.791 7.447  358  16.681 7.838  (-1.63) 
CAMELS  rating    438  1.550 0.498  360  1.558 0.497  (-0.23) 
NMBs 
Rotating NMB, starting FDIC  Rotating NMB, starting STATE 
Bank variables, 1996:Q1 N  Mean SD N  Mean SD t-stat 
Non performing to loans  1695  1.059  1.284  1202  1.081  1.329  (-0.44) 
Delinquency  rate  1695  2.935 2.360  1202  3.039 2.488  (-1.14) 
ROA  1696  0.313 0.143  1204  0.329 0.146  (-2.94) 
% growth in loans   1695  0.859  5.166  1198  0.808  5.511  (0.25) 
Leverage  ratio  1696  10.553 3.322  1199  10.751 3.465  (-1.55) 
Tier1  RBCR  1692  17.289 8.291  1198  17.604 8.435  (-0.99) 
CAMELS  rating    1698  1.732 0.443  1204  1.701 0.458  (1.83) 
 
Notes: The table presents the summary statistics. Our sample restricts the data to state and non-state member banks that have switched regulators 
at least once since 1996:Q1. We also remove observations that correspond to CAMELS ratings of 3 or greater in the most recent exam, concurrent 
exams by the State and the Federal Regulator, and outlier banks. The last column reports the t-statistics of a test of difference in the means.  35 
 




FRB-STATE SMB  FDIC-STATE NMB 
# banks  Percent  # banks  Percent 
1 3  0.29  0  0.00 
2 22  2.11  3  0.06 
3 48  4.61  29  0.54 
4 210  20.15  206  3.87 
5 370  35.51  980  18.39 
6 256  24.57  2,167  40.66 
7 73  7.01  1,196  22.44 
8 26  2.5  346  6.49 
9 16  1.54  159  2.98 
10 7  0.67  80  1.50 
11 7  0.67  35  0.66 
12 1  0.1  37  0.69 
>12 3  0.29  91  1.71 
Total 1,042  5,329 
 
Notes: The table shows the time between supervisor rotations for the banks in our sample.  Our sample restricts the 
data to state and non-state member banks that have switched regulators at least once since 1996:Q1. We also remove 
observations that correspond to CAMELS ratings of 3 or greater in the most recent exam, concurrent exams by the 









Table 3: Impact of Supervisor Identity on CAMELS Ratings and its components for SMB 
 















Within-bank  mean  1.680 1.490  1.510 1.768 1.900  1.578  1.721 
Within-bank  SD  0.295 0.290  0.396 0.331 0.435  0.300  0.288 
Lead agency = FRB   0.096***  0.038***  0.077***  0.135***  0.099***  0.061***  0.096*** 
[0.011] [0.012]  [0.020] [0.012] [0.014]  [0.009]  [0.018] 
Cluster    State State  State State State  State  State 
Fixed  effects  Quarter Quarter  Quarter Quarter Quarter  Quarter  Quarter 
Bank ID  Bank ID  Bank ID  Bank ID  Bank ID  Bank ID  Bank ID 
Observations  38110 38107  38110 38108 38108  38108  32479 
Adjusted  R-squared  0.551 0.528  0.449 0.493 0.580  0.529  0.473 
# of banks  1042  1042  1042  1042  1042  1042  976 
# of clusters  41  41  41  41  41  41  41 
 
Notes: The table reports the results from an OLS regression that examines the effect of the FRB being the lead regulatory agency on CAMELS rating and its 
subcomponents. Our sample restricts the data to state and non-state member banks that have switched regulators at least once since 1996:Q1. We also remove 
observations that correspond to CAMELS ratings of 3 or greater in the most recent exam, concurrent exams by the State and the Federal Regulator, and outlier 
banks. We include quarter and bank fixed effects and the errors are clustered at the state level. *** significant at 1% level. ** significant at 5% level. * 












Table 4: Impact of Supervisor Identity on CAMELS Ratings and its components for NMB 
 















Within-bank mean  1.686  1.508  1.587  1.784  1.862  1.547  1.640 
Within-bank SD  0.389  0.363  0.500  0.426  0.490  0.347  0.319 
Lead agency = FDIC   0.072***  0.059***  0.072***  0.088***  0.063***  0.037***  0.051*** 
[0.007] [0.010]  [0.012]  [0.009]  [0.011] [0.008] [0.007] 
Cluster   State  State  State  State  State  State  State 
Fixed effects  Quarter  Quarter  Quarter  Quarter  Quarter  Quarter  Quarter 
Bank ID  Bank ID  Bank ID  Bank ID  Bank ID  Bank ID  Bank ID 
Observations 240576  240572  240572  240572  240572  240572  211836 
Adjusted R-squared  0.496  0.489  0.427  0.466  0.485  0.505  0.474 
# of banks  5329  5329  5329  5329  5329  5329  5310 
# of clusters  48  48  48  48  48  48  48 
 
Notes: The table reports the results from an OLS regression that examines the effect of the FRB being the lead regulatory agency on CAMELS rating and its 
subcomponents Our sample restricts the data to state and non-state member banks that have switched regulators at least once since 1996:Q1. We also remove 
observations that correspond to CAMELS ratings of 3 or greater in the most recent exam, concurrent exams by the State and the Federal Regulator, and outlier 
banks. We include quarter and bank fixed effects and the errors are clustered at the state level. *** significant at 1% level. ** significant at 5% level. * 











Table 5: Tabulation of composite CAMELS upgrades and downgrades 
 
SMBs, FRB-STATE rotating 
Drop in CAMELS   Increase in CAMELS  
Freq. Percent Freq. Percent 
FRB  284 42.84  741 76.08 
STATE  379 57.16  233 23.92 
Total  663 100  974 100 
Mean SD Mean SD 
 
∆CAMELS  -1.017 0.139  1.093 0.318 
NMBs, FDIC-STATE rotating 
Drop in CAMELS   Increase in CAMELS  
Freq. Percent Freq. Percent 
FDIC  2,737 57.63  3,393 65.05 
STATE  2,012 42.37  1,823 34.95 
Total  4,749 100  5,216 100 
Mean SD Mean SD 
 
∆CAMELS  -1.109 0.364  1.125 0.377 
 
Notes: The table reports the summary statistics of the upgrades and downgrades by both the FDIC/State and 
FRB/State, conditional on observing change in composite CAMELS ratings. Our sample restricts the data to state 
and non-state member banks that have switched regulators at least once since 1996:Q1. We also remove 
observations that correspond to CAMELS ratings of 3 or greater in the most recent exam, concurrent exams by the 
State and the Federal Regulator, and outlier banks. Sample 1996:Q1-2010:Q4. 
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Table 6: Impact of supervisor identity on composite CAMELS upgrades and downgrades 
 
=1 if CAMELS  
Drops 
=1 if CAMELS 
increases 
(1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Within-bank mean  0.017  0.021  0.026  0.022 
Within-bank SD  0.085  0.112  0.118  0.114 
Lead agency = FRB  -0.008***  0.023*** 
[0.002] [0.002] 











Entity type  SMB  NMB  SMB  NMB 
Cluster   State  State  State  State 
Fixed effects  Quarter  Quarter  Quarter  Quarter 
Bank ID  Bank ID  Bank ID  Bank ID 
Observations 38110  240576  38110  240576 
Adjusted R-squared  0.001  0.009  0.011  0.005 
# of banks  1042  5329  1042  5329 
# of clusters  41  48  41  48 
 
Notes: The table reports the results from an OLS regression that examines the impact of the FRB or the FDIC being 
the lead regulatory agency when the composite CAMELS ratings increase or decrease. Columns 1 and 2 report the 
results for CAMELS increases and columns 3 and 4 report the results for CAMELS decreases. Our sample restricts 
the data to state and non-state member banks that have switched regulators at least once since 1996:Q1. We also 
remove observations that correspond to CAMELS ratings of 3 or greater in the most recent exam, concurrent exams 
by the State and the Federal Regulator, and outlier banks. We include quarter and bank fixed effects and the errors 





Table 7: Impact of Supervisor Identity on Bank Variables 
 
Panel A: SMBs 











Within-bank mean 14.911  9.683  0.258  1.011  2.395 
Within-bank SD 2.408  1.198  0.141  0.790  1.322 
Lead agency = FRB   0.201***  0.072***  -0.005***  0.054***  0.054*** 
[0.046] [0.022]  [0.002]  [0.011]  [0.015] 
Cluster   State  State  State  State  State 
Fixed effects  Quarter  Quarter  Quarter  Quarter  Quarter 
Bank ID  Bank ID  Bank ID  Bank ID  Bank ID 
Observations 37932  38018  37926  38068  38097 
Adjusted R-squared  0.794  0.743  0.390  0.378  0.472 
# of banks  1040  1040  1041  1042  1042 
# of clusters  41  41  41  41  41 
 
Panel B: NMBs 











Within-bank mean  16.048  10.355  0.259  1.132  2.633 
Within-bank SD  2.785  1.395  0.163  1.006  1.608 
Lead agency = FDIC  0.058**  0.044**  -0.004***  0.023***  0.022 
[0.029] [0.019]  [0.002]  [0.007]  [0.014] 
Cluster   State  State  State  State  State 
Fixed effects  Quarter  Quarter  Quarter  Quarter  Quarter 
Bank ID  Bank ID  Bank ID  Bank ID  Bank ID 
Observations 239423  239598  238949  239436  240093 
Adjusted R-squared  0.794  0.750  0.373  0.356  0.438 
# of banks  5323  5325  5329  5318  5329 
# of clusters  48  48  48  48  48 
 
Notes: The table reports the results from an OLS regression that examines the effect of federal agencies being the 
lead regulatory agency on the balance sheet variables of the banks. Panel A presents results for Fed (SMBs) and 
Panel B presents results for FDIC (NMBs). Column 1 looks at the Tier 1 RBCR, column 2 looks at the Leverage 
ratio, column 3 looks at the ROA, column 4 looks at Non-performing loans, and column 5 looks at delinquency 
rates. Our sample restricts the data to state and non-state member banks that have switched regulators at least once 
since 1996:Q1. We also remove observations that correspond to CAMELS ratings of 3 or greater in the most recent 
exam, concurrent exams by the State and the Federal Regulator, and outlier banks. We include quarter and bank 
fixed effects and the errors are clustered at the state level. *** significant at 1% level. ** significant at 5% level. * 




Table 8: Impact of Supervisor Identity on Bank Variables (Dynamic Effects) 
 
Panel A: SMBs 











Within-bank mean  14.911  9.683  0.258  1.011  2.395 
Within-bank SD  2.408  1.198  0.141  0.790  1.322 
Lead agency = FRB, t   0.242***  0.092***  -0.009***  0.074***  0.062*** 
[0.051] [0.026]  [0.002]  [0.015]  [0.019] 
Lead agency = STATE, t-1  0.107*  0.042*  -0.015***  0.065***  0.020 
[0.054] [0.024]  [0.002]  [0.019]  [0.026] 
Lead agency = STATE, t-2  0.105  0.062**  -0.007*  0.036**  0.019 
[0.071] [0.029]  [0.003]  [0.017]  [0.027] 
Cluster   State  State  State  State  State 
Fixed effects  Quarter  Quarter  Quarter  Quarter  Quarter 
Bank ID  Bank ID  Bank ID  Bank ID  Bank ID 
Observations 37932  38018  37926  38068  38097 
Adjusted R-squared  0.794  0.743  0.391  0.378  0.472 
# of banks  1040  1040  1041  1042  1042 



















Within-bank mean  16.048  10.355  0.259  1.132  2.633 
Within-bank SD  2.785  1.395  0.163  1.006  1.608 
Lead agency = FDIC, t  0.058*  0.045**  -0.009***  0.022***  0.011 
[0.032] [0.019]  [0.002]  [0.008]  [0.016] 
Lead agency = STATE, t-1  -0.006  -0.015  -0.023***  -0.005  -0.041** 
[0.051] [0.027]  [0.002]  [0.011]  [0.017] 
Lead agency = STATE, t-2  0.003  0.021  -0.008***  -0.003  -0.029** 
[0.057] [0.028]  [0.002]  [0.009]  [0.012] 
Cluster   State  State  State  State  State 
Fixed effects  Quarter  Quarter  Quarter  Quarter  Quarter 
Bank ID  Bank ID  Bank ID  Bank ID  Bank ID 
Observations 239423  239598  238949  239436  240093 
Adjusted R-squared  0.794  0.750  0.374  0.356  0.438 
# of banks  5323  5325  5329  5318  5329 
# of clusters  48  48  48  48  48 
 
Notes: The table reports the results from an OLS regression that examines the effect of federal agencies being the 
lead regulatory agency on the balance sheet variables of the banks. Panel A presents results for Fed (SMBs) and 
Panel B presents results for FDIC (NMBs). We modify specification in Table 7 by including two additional 
regressors to look at the anticipatory effect of the downgrade. Column 1 looks at the Tier 1 RBCR, column 2 looks 
at the Leverage ratio, column 3 looks at the ROA, column 4 looks at Non-performing loans, and column 5 looks at 
delinquency rates. Our sample restricts the data to state and non-state member banks that have switched regulators at 
least once since 1996:Q1. We also remove observations that correspond to CAMELS ratings of 3 or greater in the 
most recent exam, concurrent exams by the State and the Federal Regulator, and outlier banks. We include quarter 
and bank fixed effects and the errors are clustered at the state level. *** significant at 1% level. ** significant at 5% 
level. * significant at 10% level. Sample 1996:Q1-2010:Q4. 
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Table 9: Supervisor Identity, CAMELS, and Bank Failure and Problem-Bank Rates 
 
Panel A: Panel Regression 













Within-bank mean  1.641  1.728  1.629  1.741 
Within-bank SD  0.359  0.389  0.356  0.393 
(1) (2) 
Lead agency = Federal*Below median  0.057***  0.061*** 
[0.008] [0.010] 
Lead agency = Federal*Above median  0.098***  0.094*** 
   [0.008]    [0.007] 
p-value for difference in coefficients (0.001)  (0.014) 
Cluster State  State 
Fixed effects  Quarter  Quarter 
   Bank ID    Bank ID 
Observations 278972  278972 
Adjusted R-squared  0.496  0.495 
# of banks  6373  6373 
# of clusters  48    48 
 
Panel B: Cross-sectional Regression 
Bank Failure Rate:  
SMBs and NMBs 
Mean Failure Rate  0.066  0.075 
   (1)  (2) 
Federal-State spread  0.433*  0.775** 
[0.246] [0.312] 
Observations 45  40 
Adjusted R-squared  0.046  0.117 
 
Notes: This table reports the results from an OLS regression that examines the effect of the federal regulators being 
the lead regulatory agency on CAMELS rating, splitting the states into two groups based on the bank failure rate and 
problem-bank rates during the sample period. We examine the effects in this table across both SMBs and NMBs 
treating both types of federal regulators as the same entity. In Panel A, columns 1 examine banks in states that had 
bank failure rates below and above the median cross-state rate, while columns 2 examines banks in states that had 
problem-bank rates below and above the median cross-state rate. Panel B presents cross-sectional regression of the 
bank failure rate during the sample period on the average composite CAMELS Federal-state spread. In column 1 we 
take all the states while in column 2 we restrict the sample with more than twenty banks. Our sample restricts the 
data to state and non-state member banks that have switched regulators at least once since 1996:Q1 . We also 
remove observations that correspond to CAMELS ratings of 3 or greater, concurrent exams by the State and the 
Federal Regulator, and outlier banks. *** significant at 1% level. ** significant at 5% level. * significant at 10% 
level. Sample 1996:Q1-2010:Q4. 44 
 
 
Table 10: Supervisor Identity and Credit Supply 
 
% Loan growth 
Within-bank mean 2.662 
Within-bank SD 5.227 
Lead agency = Federal   0.012 
[0.036] 
Cluster   State 
Fixed effects  Quarter 
Bank ID 
Observations 276499 
Adjusted R-squared  0.151 
# of banks  6354 
# of clusters  48 
 
Notes: The table reports the results from an OLS regression that examines the effect of federal agencies being the 
lead regulatory agency on percent loan growth of banks We examine the effects in this table across both SMBs and 
NMBs treating both types of federal regulators as the same entity. Our sample restricts the data to state and non-state 
member banks that have switched regulators at least once since 1996:Q1. We also remove observations that 
correspond to CAMELS ratings of 3 or greater in the most recent exam, concurrent exams by the State and the 
Federal Regulator, and outlier banks. We include quarter and bank fixed effects and the errors are clustered at the 









Within-bank mean 1.694  1.636 
Within-bank SD 0.387  0.310 
Federal agency * Non-public dummy 0.080*** 
[0.008] 
Federal agency * Public dummy 0.058*** 
   [0.011] 
p-value for difference in coefficients (0.090) 
Cluster State 
Fixed effects Quarter 
 Bank  ID 
Observations 278972 
Adjusted R-squared  0.495 
# of banks  6373 
# of clusters  48 
 
Notes: The table reports the results from an OLS regression that examines the effect of federal regulators being the 
lead agencies on CAMELS ratings, splitting the sample into public and private banks.  We examine the effects in 
this table across both SMBs and NMBs treating both types of federal regulators as the same entity. Columns 1 and 2 
look at non-public and public banks for the FRB and columns 3 and 4 look at non-public and public banks for the 
FDIC. Our sample restricts the data to state and non-state member banks that have switched regulators at least once 
since 1996:Q1. We also remove observations that correspond to CAMELS ratings of 3 or greater in the most recent 
exam, concurrent exams by the State and the Federal Regulator, and outlier banks. We include quarter and bank 
fixed effects and the errors are clustered at the state level. *** significant at 1% level. ** significant at 5% level. * 












Within-bank mean 1.623  1.751 
Within-bank SD 0.217  0.249 
Federal agency * Pre-crisis dummy 0.042*** 
[0.007] 
Federal agency * Crisis dummy 0.113*** 
   [0.015] 
p-value for difference in coefficients (0.001) 
Cluster State 
Fixed effects Quarter 
 Bank  ID 
Observations 185689 
Adjusted R-squared  0.578 
# of banks  5854 
# of clusters  48 
 
Notes: The table reports the results from an OLS regression that examines the effect of federal regulators being the 
lead agencies on CAMELS ratings, splitting the sample into crisis (2007-2009) and pre-crisis period (2000-2006). 
We examine the effects in this table across both SMBs and NMBs treating both types of federal regulators as the 
same entity. Columns 1 and 2 look at pre-crisis and crisis period for the FRB and columns 3 and 4 look at pre-crisis 
and crisis periods for the FDIC. Our sample restricts the data to state and non-state member banks that have 
switched regulators at least once since 1996:Q1. We also remove observations that correspond to CAMELS ratings 
of 3 or greater in the most recent exam, concurrent exams by the State and the Federal Regulator, and outlier banks.  
We include quarter and bank fixed effects and the errors are clustered at the state level. *** significant at 1% level. 


















Table 13: Effect of Bank Size on Supervisor Identify Impact on CAMELS ratings 
     
Composite CAMELS 
Within-bank mean 1.685 
Within-bank SD 0.374 
Lead agency = Federal  0.072*** 
[0.008] 
Federal * 75th pctile asset dummy  0.022*** 
[0.007] 
75th pctile asset dummy  0.011 
   [0.015] 
Cluster   State 
Fixed effects  Quarter 
   Bank ID 
Observations 278972 
Adjusted R-squared  0.495 
# of banks  6373 
# of clusters  48 
 
Notes: The table reports the results from an OLS regression that examines the effect of federal regulators being the 
lead agencies on CAMELS ratings. We examine the effects in this table across both SMBs and NMBs treating both 
types of federal regulators as the same entity.  Our sample restricts the data to state and non-state member banks that 
have switched regulators at least once since 1996:Q1. We also remove observations that correspond to CAMELS 
ratings of 3 or greater in the most recent exam, concurrent exams by the State and the Federal Regulator, and outlier 
banks.  We include quarter and bank fixed effects and the errors are clustered at the state level. *** significant at 1% 
level. ** significant at 5% level. * significant at 10% level. Sample 1996:Q1-2010:Q4. 48 
 
Table 14: State Supervisor Characteristics and Impact of Supervisor identity on CAMELS ratings 
 
% spent on staff 
training 
# of examiners to # of 
SMB/NMB 
% of examiners with 
>5 years experience 













Within-bank mean 1.678  1.698  1.648  1.798  1.674  1.694 
Within-bank SD 0.371  0.382  0.374  0.379  0.371  0.378 
Federal agency * Below median  0.082***  0.071***  0.064*** 
[0.010] [0.009]  [0.007] 
Federal agency * Above median  0.069***  0.096***  0.087*** 
 [0.009]  [0.011]  [0.010] 
p-value for difference in coefficients (0.335) (0.087)  (0.083) 
Cluster State State  State 
Fixed Effects Quarter  Quarter  Quarter 
  Bank ID  Bank ID  Bank ID 
Observations 268494  276537  276537 
Adjusted R-squared  0.494  0.494  0.494 
# of banks  6144  6319  6319 
# of clusters  44  47  47 
 
Notes: The table reports the results from an OLS regression that examines the effect of federal regulators being the lead agencies on CAMELS ratings estimated on 
subsamples split based on characteristics of state supervisors. We examine the effects in this table across both SMBs and NMBs treating both types of federal 
regulators as the same entity. Our sample restricts the data to state and non-state member banks that have switched regulators at least once since 1996:Q1. We also 
remove observations that correspond to CAMELS ratings of 3 or greater in the most recent exam, concurrent exams by the State and the Federal Regulator, and 
outlier banks. We include quarter and bank fixed effects and the errors are clustered at the state level. *** significant at 1% level. ** significant at 5% level. * 
significant at 10% level. Sample 1996:Q1-2010:Q4. 
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Table 15: Supervisor Identity on CAMEL Ratings and its components (all federal regulators) 
 









Within-bank mean 1.761  1.761  1.761  1.761 
Within-bank SD 0.299  0.299  0.299  0.299 
FRB 0.138***  0.126***  0.116***  0.108*** 
[0.016] [0.016]  [0.012] [0.012] 
FDIC 0.107***  0.097***  0.077***  0.066*** 
[0.013] [0.011]  [0.011] [0.008] 
OCC 0.156***  0.152***  0.150***  0.171*** 
[0.020] [0.021]  [0.019] [0.021] 
OTS 0.221  0.132  0.156  0.069 
   [0.137]  [0.180]  [0.132]  [0.184] 
Fixed effects  Bank  Bank 
      Quarter     Quarter 
Observations 414892  414892  414892  414892 
Adjusted R-squared  0.139  0.167  0.510  0.537 
# of banks  11193  11193  11193  11193 
# of clusters  51  51  51  51 
 
 
Notes: The table reports the results from an OLS regression of the FRB, FDIC, OCC or OTS being the lead regulators with the State regulator being the omitted 
category. The data includes all banks starting 1996:Q1. Columns (1)-(2) include ROA, Tier 1 capital ratio, Log(Assets). Standard errors are clustered at the state 
level. *** significant at 1% level. ** significant at 5% level. * significant at 10% level. Sample 1996:Q1-2010:Q4. 50 
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Appendix Table 1: Impact of Supervisor Identity on CAMELS Ratings and its components  
Removing outlier observations 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  (13)  (14) 
Mean  1.680 1.690 1.484 1.505 1.509 1.591 1.764 1.784 1.906 1.864 1.577 1.549 1.726 1.639 
















FRB  0.093*** 0.034*** 0.074*** 0.131*** 0.091*** 0.056*** 0.097*** 
[0.012] [0.013] [0.020] [0.013] [0.014] [0.009] [0.019] 
Agency = 
FDIC  0.067*** 0.054*** 0.067*** 0.082*** 0.061*** 0.031*** 0.049*** 
[0.007] [0.010] [0.012] [0.009] [0.012] [0.008] [0.008] 
Cluster    State State State State State State State State State State State State State State 
Fixed  effects  Quarter Quarter Quarter Quarter Quarter Quarter Quarter Quarter Quarter Quarter Quarter Quarter Quarter Quarter 
Bank ID  Bank ID  Bank ID  Bank ID  Bank ID  Bank ID  Bank ID  Bank ID  Bank ID  Bank ID  Bank ID  Bank ID  Bank ID  Bank ID 
Observations  34454 217073 34451 217073 34454 217073 34452 217073 34452 217073 34452 217073 29345 190710 
Adj. R-
squared  0.547 0.496 0.519 0.478 0.447 0.429 0.490 0.470 0.578 0.484 0.517 0.496 0.472 0.478 
#  of  banks  1032 5259 1032 5259 1032 5259 1032 5259 1032 5259 1032 5259  963  5219 
#  of  clusters  41 48 41 48 41 48 41 48 41 48 41 48 41 48 56 
 
Appendix Table 2: Tabulation of Supervisor identity and subcomponents of CAMELS 
 
Capital adequacy rating  Asset quality rating  Management rating 
SMBs, FRB-STATE rotating  SMBs, FRB-STATE rotating  SMBs, FRB-STATE rotating 
Drop Increase  Drop  Increase  Drop  Increase 
Freq. Pct Freq. Pct Freq. Pct Freq. Pct Freq. Pct Freq. Pct 
FRB  258 50.59  551 63.19  418 47.23  871  65.1  371  39.51  849 77.89 
STATE  252 49.41  321 36.81  467 52.77  467  34.9  568  60.49  241 22.11 
Total  510 100  872 100  885 100  1,338  100  939  100  1,090  100 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
 ∆CAMELS  -1.022 0.158  1.077 0.295  -1.027 0.169  1.127 0.371  -1.034 0.193  1.103 0.330 
NMBs, FDIC-STATE rotating  NMBs, FDIC-STATE rotating  NMBs, FDIC-STATE rotating 
Drop Increase  Drop  Increase  Drop  Increase 
Freq. Pct Freq. Pct Freq. Pct Freq. Pct Freq. Pct Freq. Pct 
FDIC  2,282 57.35  2,981 64.22  3,374 56.85  4,316 60.26  3,386  55.38  4,090  66.7 
STATE  1,697 42.65  1,661 35.78  2,561 43.15  2,846 39.74  2,728  44.62  2,042  33.3 
Total  3,979 100  4,642 100  5,935 100  7,162 100  6,114  100  6,132 100 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
 ∆CAMELS  -1.105 0.371  1.121 0.388  -1.141 0.424  1.176 0.445  -1.089 0.327  1.115 0.357 
Earnings rating  Liquidity rating  Sensitivity rating 
SMBs, FRB-STATE rotating  SMBs, FRB-STATE rotating  SMBs, FRB-STATE rotating 
Drop Increase  Drop  Increase  Drop  Increase 
Freq. Pct Freq. Pct Freq. Pct Freq. Pct Freq. Pct Freq. Pct 
FRB  492 46.46  843 67.77  392  49  591 69.45  247  37.83  580 72.59 
STATE  567 53.54  401 32.23  408  51  260 30.55  406  62.17  219 27.41 
Total  1,059 100  1,244 100  800  100  851  100  653  100  799  100 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
 ∆CAMELS  -1.044 0.219  1.178 0.478  -1.013 0.122  1.066 0.283  -1.023 0.150  1.045 0.214 
NMBs, FDIC-STATE rotating  NMBs, FDIC-STATE rotating  NMBs, FDIC-STATE rotating 
Drop Increase  Drop  Increase  Drop  Increase 
Freq. Pct Freq. Pct Freq. Pct Freq. Pct Freq. Pct Freq. Pct 
FDIC  3,623 57.36  3,751 58.44  2,610 56.26  3,033 62.52  1,989  52.31  3,032 65.73 
STATE  2,693 42.64  2,667 41.56  2,029 43.74  1,818 37.48  1,813  47.69  1,581 34.27 
Total  6,316 100  6,418 100  4,639 100  4,851 100  3,802  100  4,613 100 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 




Appendix Table 3: Tabulation for banks that eventually fail 
 
Banks that eventually receive 4 or 5 rating, 
before they receive 4 or 5 rating:  
SMBs, FRB-STATE rotating 
Drop in CAMELS   Increase in CAMELS  
Freq. Percent Freq. Percent 
FRB  13 32.5  37 71.1 
STATE  27 67.5  15 28.9 
Total  40 100  52 100 
Mean SD Mean SD 
 
∆CAMELS  -1.000 0.000  1.038 0.194 
NMBs, FDIC-STATE rotating 
Drop in CAMELS   Increase in CAMELS  
Freq. Percent Freq. Percent 
FDIC  169 64.5  148 61.7 
STATE  93 35.5  92  38.  3 
Total  262 100  240 100 
Mean SD Mean SD 
 




Appendix Table 4: Impact of Supervisor Identity on Bank Variables 
A more detailed look at Delinquency, NPA and ROA 
 
Panel A: SMBs 



















Within-bank mean  0.7935  1.2969  2.221  1.327  0.0649  0.792 
Within-bank SD  0.8319  1.6519  1.609  1.807  0.0833  0.1251 
FRB 0.048***  0.136***  0.051*  0.090***  0.004***  0.004** 
[0.017] [0.034] [0.027] [0.028]  [0.001]  [0.002] 
Cluster  State State State State  State  State 
Fixed  Effects  Quarter Quarter Quarter Quarter  Quarter  Quarter 
Bank ID  Bank ID  Bank ID  Bank ID  Bank ID  Bank ID 
Observations  37848 24444 37879 37833  37930  37888 
Adjusted  R-squared  0.298 0.291 0.378 0.321  0.247  0.663 
#  of  banks  1037 840 1037  1035 1041 1040 
# of clusters  41  40  41  41  41  41 
 
Panel B: NMBs 



















Within-bank mean  0.9014  1.46196  2.587  1.659  0.0680  0.7692 
Within-bank SD  1.05485  2.06448  2.012  2.547  0.0951  0.1294 
FDIC 0.019**  0.074***  0.021  0.055**  0.001  0.005*** 
[0.007] [0.025] [0.017] [0.027]  [0.001]  [0.001] 
Cluster  State State State State  State  State 
Fixed  Effects  Quarter Quarter Quarter Quarter  Quarter  Quarter 
Bank ID  Bank ID  Bank ID  Bank ID  Bank ID  Bank ID 
Observations  237934 159006 238139 237834  238936  239498 
Adjusted  R-squared  0.278 0.268 0.373 0.297  0.239  0.658 
# of banks  5286  4835  5286  5289  5329  5318 
# of clusters  48  48  48  48  48  48 
 